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Antitrust and Distribution Problems in
Tight Oligopolies-- A Case Study of the
Automobile Industry
By Jost J. Schmitt*
For decades, considerable legislative and legal inquiry has focused
on automobile dealers. This inquiry has sought, among other things,
to uncover their contractual and factual relationships with automobile
manufacturers. The sum of these relationships is a franchised distribu-
tion system. However, the systems's legal implications have never re-
ceived a thorough treatment. This article undertakes to focus on the
dealer-manufacturer relationship from the viewpoint of the consumer,
who is the ultimate beneficiary or victim of the current distribution
system.
This article will summarize those elements of structure, conduct
and performance which characterize the competitive situation in the au-
tomobile industry. The existence of high barriers to entry will be given
particular attention. This discussion will be followed by an analysis of
current distribution methods and their contribution to product differ-
entiation. These economic factors serve as the foundation for a new
legal approach to the distribution systems imposed by the automobile
producers. It will be argued that the systematic relationship between
the manufacturers and their respective dealer networks constitutes a
combination within the meaning of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Consequently, the management of this combination, whether unilateral
or bilateral, is susceptible to a test of reasonableness because restraints
of trade are inherent in every selective distribution system. Addition-
ally, special attention will be given to the legality of the location clause.
All features of the automobile retail level, however, will not be scruti-
nized for their antitrust law relevance. For example, the entire com-
plex of customer restrictions, fleet sales and price discrimination are
* Referendar, 1970, Umversity of Tuebmgen, West Germany; LL.M., 1972,
University of California, Berkeley.
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omitted. Yet, the areas analyzed reveal that the automobile distribu-
tion system is far from being free of practices condemned by the anti-
trust laws.
The Structure of the American Automobile Industry
and the Performance of Its Member Firms
Since the incorporation of Ford Motor Company in 1903, 2600
different makes of American passenger cars have come-and mostly
gone.' The number of automobile manufacturers reached its peak at
88 in 1921. A rapid decline followed. By 1935, only 10 manufactur-
ers remained.' This number dwindled to 5 by 1960. Since the exit
of Studebaker-Packard in 1966,1 General Motors, Ford, Chrysler and
American Motors factually represent the domestic passenger car indus-
try. These four manufacturers produce 12 makes of automobiles.'
1. Comment, Antitrust Law and the New Industrial State: An Application to
Automobile Distribution Practices, 4 U.S.F.L. REV. 78, 81 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Distribution Practices].
2. For a detailed depiction of the early development of the automobile industry
see R. EPSTEIN, THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY (1928) [hereinafter cited as EPSTEIN];
E. KENNEDY, THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY (1941) [hereinafter cited as KENNEDY]; A.
NEVINS & F. HILL, FORD: THE TIMES, THE MAN, THE COMPANY (1954); L. SELTZER,
A FINCIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY (1928) [hereinafter
cited as SELTZER].
3. A good description of the demise of Studebaker Packard is given in C.
EDWARDS, DYNAMICS OF THE UNITED STATES AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 70-103 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as EDWARDS, DYNAMICS]. See also L. WHITE, THE AUTOMOBILE
INDUSTRY SINCE 1945 (1971) [hereinafter cited as WHITE].
4. The market shares of the domestic firms, including foreign makes, from 1960
are:
Source: Automotive News, various editions.
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
G.M. 43.7% 46.5% 51.9% 51.0% 49.1%
Ford 26.6% 28.5% 26.3% 24.9% 26.0%
Chrysler 14.0% 10.8% 9.6% 12.4% 13.8%
American M, 6.4% 6.3% 6.1% 5.7% 4.7%
Studeb./Pack. 1.6% 1.2% 1.1% 0.8% 0.3%
Foreign/Misc. 7.7% 6.7% 5.0% 5.2% 6.1%
Dom.
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
G.M. 50.1% 48.1% 49.6% 46.7% 46.8%
Ford 25.5% 26.1% 22.2% 23.7% 24.3%
Chrysler 14.7% 15.4% 16.1% 16.2% 15.1%
American M. 3.5% 3.0% 2.8% 2.7% 2.5%
Studeb./Pack. 0.1% - - - -
Foreign/Misc. 6.1% 7.4% 9.3% 10.7% 11.3%
Dom.
1970 1971 1972 (first six months)
G.M. 39.73% 45.16% 44.91%
Ford 26.42% 23.52% 24.29%
Chrysler 16.09% 13.71% 13.74%
American M. 3.03% 2.50% 2.92%
Foreign/Misc. 14.73% 15.11% 14.14%
Dom.
(Source: Automotive News, Aug. 21, 1972, p. 4)
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Three of these manufacturers are industrial giants by all methods of
comparison.
Little has to be said about the relative size of the Big Three within
American business enterprises.' Furthermore, the automobile indus-
try is immensely important to the American economy as a purchaser,
employer and taxpayer. Numerous other areas of the economy are af-
fected, directly or indirectly, by the industry. While no serious dis-
cussion of aspects of this industry should fail to recognize and appraise
its influential position as one of the cores of the nation's economic wel-
fare, this must not mean that the industry's participants are immune
from a close check of their behavior as well as their performance.
Such scrutiny is necessary because the situation in the automobile
industry cannot be labeled as competitive in the structural economic
sense. The model situation that no single producer is a big enough
part of the total market to have any personal influence on the market
price is far from being fulfilled. In fact, the passenger car industry
bears all structural characteristics of a tight oligopoly. Indeed, it is
cited often as the classic example of an industry where few sellers act in
full knowledge of their mutual interdependence. Each seller is aware
that certain business decisions strongly affect its competitors and might
be unprofitable or even disadvantageous for the initiator in the course
of retaliatory or duplicative response.
Bigness of an industry or a firm, although it might automatically
be watched with suspicion as jeopardizing "[t]he general objective of
the antitrust laws . . . [which is the] promotion of competition in open
markets,"6 is not necessarily detrimental to the goals of an optimally
functioning economy. Rather, the discussion boils down to the ques-
tion of how much private economic power can permissibily be substi-
tuted for the free force of the market place without losing the values
usually attributed to competition. Competition leads to efficient allo-
cation of resources, high product quality and reasonable prices, con-
sumer choice among various types and qualities of goods and services.
It enhances producer freedom to enter lines of production that offer
5. According to the rank by sales in Fortune Magazine's list of the 500 largest
United States industrial corporations, 1954-68, General Motors was always number 1,
Ford vacillated between 2 and 3, Chrysler recently maintained number 5 after a drop-
back in the early 1960s and even "dwarf" American Motors ranked among the 63 larg-
est corporations betwen 1959 and 1965 before falling back to 131 by 1968. Hearings on
the Role of Giant Corporations in the American and World Economies Before the Sub-
comm. on Monopoly of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1, at 4 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Hearings, Giant Corporations].
6. REPORT, ATrORNEY GENERAL'S NAT'L COMM. To STuDY THE ANTITRUST LAws
1 (1955) [hereinafter cited as REPORT: ANTnTUST LAws].
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greater profits or other advantages. Laborers are benefited because
they are given greater freedom of choice in selecting occupations and
employers. Finally, competition provides businesses with incentive to
adopt more efficient modes of production and distribution and to de-
velop new or improved products in order to gain customers.7  None-
theless, "[s]ome power [is necessary], both because of inescapable lim-
itations to the process of atomization and because power is needed to
do the job the American public expects of its industrial machinery."'
"By all but the pathologically romantic, it is now recognized that
this is not the age of the small man. ' Advanced technologies have
necessitated the expansion of firms beyond the smallness which is one
of the prerequisites for the existence of a perfectly competitive market.
The task of the antitrust laws cannot be and is not seen as turning back
the wheel of industrial development to a state where pure market forces
no longer are tampered with by size, interdependence and output-price
determinations of firms. However, according to the basic ideology of
the antitrust laws, the model of perfect competition still serves as a
standard that yields the best possible results for the community. De-
viations from this standard will be tolerated as long as competition in
an industry is still workable in a pragmatic sense,'" as long as its re-
sults do not fall too short of the ideal of perfect competition" and as
long as clearly better alternatives are not conceivable or practically at-
tainable. 2
7. J. ANDERSON, POLITICS AND THE ECONOMY 159-60 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as ANDERSON].
8. E. MASON, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM 387
(1957).
9. J. GALBRArTH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 32 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
GALBRAITH].
10. The theory of workable competition was pioneered in Clark, Toward a Con-
cept of Workable Competition in READINGS IN THE SOCIAL CONTROL (1942). It "does
not provide a standard of legality under any of the antitrust laws." REPORT: ANTI-
TRUST LAWS, supra note 6, at 316. However, some of the tests developed in the
theory permit the systematic study of market facts. Id.
11. The most significant measures of performance are: "(a) the volume of em-
ployment it provides; (b) the efficiency of production, and thus the aggregate volume
of output secured with any given volume of employment; (c) the relative stability, or
freedom from fluctuations, of output and employment over time; (d) the rate of growth
of output over time, or the rate of 'progress'; (e) composition of aggregate output
as among alternative goods to be produced; and (f) the distribution of income among
various potential income recipients." J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 13 (2d ed.
1968) [hereinafter cited as BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION].
12. Two different aspects of workable competition are embraced by this state-
ment: the purely economic weighing of actual performance against an economic
ideal and the evaluation of possible and practical means to improve performance. See
Markham, An Alternative Approach to the Concept of Workable Competition, 40 AM.
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The General Relationship Between Industry
Structure and Performance
For more than two decades, economists constantly have tried to
explore the relationship between the structural elements of American
industries and their actual performance. 3 Before giving a sketchy de-
scription of the performance of the automobile industry as the back-
ground for an economic and legal appraisal of this industry's distribu-
tion system, the findings of general economic studies must be reviewed.
The methodologically most convincing of these studies was conducted
by Joe S. Bain. 4 For forty-two census industries15 he ascertained the
relation between the five year (1936 to 1940) average annual profit
rate on equity and the 1935 concentration ratios. While his study did
not reveal any significant continuous relationship between profits and
concentration, Bain made two remarkable findings. First, in indus-
tries where the eight largest sellers in the aggregate had transgressed
the seventy percent market share threshold, the annual average profit
amounted to 11.7 percent on equity.' 6 This was contrasted with less
concentrated industries which showed an average annual profit rate on
equity of only 7.7 percent. 17 Moreover, this significant difference was
caused almost entirely by differences between the profit rates of the
larger firms in the respective industries.'" Furthermore, Bain derived
from his study an indication that concentration was not the only struc-
tural cause for excess profits:"8 "Extremes both of.seller concentration
EcoN. REv., Jun. 1950, 349, at 361. But see C. EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COm-
PETITION: REQUISITES OF A GOVERNMENTAL POLICY 9-10 (1949). These aspects are
not without difficulties. While allocative efficiency, profits and selling costs are meas-
urable, other aspects of market performance lack meaningful standards. BAIN, INDUS-
TRIAL ORGANIZAUON, supra note 11, at 419-25. However, there is little disagreement
that competition is the fundamental premise of antitrust law. See, e.g., Northern Pacific
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1, 52 (1911).
13. E.g., Bain, Relation of Profit Rate to Industry Concentration: American
Manufacturing, 1936-40, 65 Q. J. EcoN. 293 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Bain, In-
dustry Concentration]; Collins & Preston, Concentration and Price-Cost Margins in
Food Manufacturing Industries, 14 J. INDUST. ECON. 226 (1966); Mann, Seller Con-
centration, Barriers to Entry, and Rates of Return in Thirty Industries, 1950-1960, 48
Rav. ECON. & STATS. 296 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Mann]; Weiss, Average Concen-
tration Ratios and Industrial Performance, 11 J. INDUST. EcoN. 237 (1963).
14. Bain, Industry Concentration, supra note 13.
15. Census industries are groups of firms-a branch of trade-with either similar
products or processes as categorized by the Bureau of Census and the Internal Revenue
Service. Id. at 294, 304.
16. Id. at 319.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 319-20.
19. For a definition of excess profits, see id. at 387.
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and of difficulty of entry may be tentatively viewed as at least quasi-
independent characteristics of market structure that are conducive to
unworkable performance in the matter of profits."20
Bain's findings seemingly are supported by two later studies.2 ' It
is, therefore, not surprising that his study markedly influenced those
who tried to help the antitrust laws in coping with the problems created
by highly concentrated industries. The application of section 1 of the
Sherman Act 22 requires some kind of collusive behavior in restraint of
trade, and the prerequisites for proving monopolization or an attempt
to monopolize 23 are rather difficult to meet. Since interdependent be-
havior by tight oligopolists is likely to yield the same results in terms of
performance as collusive conduct, the antitrust laws turned out to be a
blunt weapon in the fight for workable competition in highly concen-
trated industries. Accordingly, a new structural approach as advanced
by Bain himself was eagerly picked up by other scholars. 24  In recom-
mending legislation to supplement present antitrust statutes, Kaysen
and Turner, 2 as well as the Task Force on Antitrust Policy,26 relied
heavily on the statistically demonstrated connection between high con-
centration and profits. These factors are clearly traceable aspects of
market performance. 27  If these proposals had grown into law, the au-
tomobile industry, save for political reasons, hardly would have escaped
a structural antitrust attack. The persistently high seller concentration,
the small number of competitors and the complete absence of success-
ful domestic entry for half a decade would have been a sufficient basis
for an assault against the Big Three.
If things were this clear, little need currently might be felt for ap-
praisal of the distribution system, which is only a small segment of the
automobile industry. Rather, the development of the industry after the
application of a structural remedy could be observed before zeroing in
20. Id. at 457 (emphasis added).
21. J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 195-97 (1956) [hereinafter cited as
BAIN, BARRIERS]; Mann, supra note 13.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
23. Id. § 2.
24. E.g., Mueller, The New Antitrust: A 'Structural' Approach, 1 ANTITRUST L.
& ECON. REV. 87 (1967). Contra, Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Sug-
gested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1562 (1969).
25. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL AN-
ALYSIs 24-43, 275-91 (1959) [hereinafter cited as KAYSEN & TURNER]
26. REPORT, WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON ANTITRUST POLICY (1968) re-
printed in Hearings, Giant Corporations, supra note 5, at pt. IA, at 877.
27. In both proposals, industries with a four firm concentration ration ov seventy
percent would be subject to antitrust attack. KAYSEN & TURN R, supra note 25, at 267;
Hearings, Giant Corporations, supra note 5, at 890-91.
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on the distribution system as one possible source of the industry's en-
trenchment against new competition and positively stimulated perfor-
mance. Unfortunately, things are not this clear. Brozen's recent re-
minder28 casts a shadow on the supposedly brightly illuminated operation
table for a ruthless structural surgery. His study discloses a lack of per-
sistence of high rates of return in highly concentrated industries, thereby
denying the asserted basis for the deconcentration recommendations.
In fact, Bain himself had warned against an overinterpretation of his
findings because his sample29 was biased towards concentrated indus-
tries in the first place. 0 Brozen objects to Bain's studies on the basis
that the economy was not at an equilibrium level during the periods for
which Bain's tests were conducted. Furthermore, these tests did not
cover a period sufficiently long enough to exclude the possibility of
windfall profits and rewards for innovations. Absent persistent supra-
competitive profits in highly concentrated industries, Brozen's notion
seems to be that the antitrust laws should not be applied hastily, but
only after self-regulation by natural market forces fails.31
Brozen's objections are not necessarily the ultimate word in the
discussion about industry concentration and profits. However, his crit-
icism certainly is a reminder that a good degree of caution should ac-
company any step toward a rigid, hasty and undifferentiated applica-
tion of structural remedies to highly concentrated industries. There-
fore, even if antitrust policy were regarded simply as a kind of eco-
nomic engineering project, 2 and even if the economic springs of the
policy could be regarded as solely determining, economists have not yet
provided antitrust law enforcers with a sound, unequivocal theoretical
basis for attacking big business as such without an individual observa-
tion of the performance in every single industry. The available em-
pirical evidence is still contradictory and hardly one-sided with regard
to the relationship between industry structure and performance.
The Performance of the Automobile Industry
While an attack on high concentration alone might be of question-
28. Brozen, The Antitrust Task Force Deconcentration Recommendation, 13 J.L.
& EcoN. 279 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Brozen].
29. Bain had profit data for 149 census industries on hand. Bain, Industry Con-
centration, supra note 13, at 314.
30. Id. at 309; Brozen, supra note 28, at 281-83.
31. See also Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Pol-
icies, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1207, 1215 (1969).
32. Compare Burk & Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 CoLumv. L. Rnv. 363
(1965) with Blake & Jones, Towards a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65
COLuM. L. Rnv. 422 (1965). See also A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE
U.S.A. 430 (2d ed. 1970).
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able value, the automobile industry verifies the hypothesis that high
seller concentration 33 and high barriers to entry34 go hand in hand with
persistently high industry profits.3 5  Also, the industry's performance
can be classified as workably competitive only by the most benign ob-
server. It was a long time ago that the Federal Trade Commission
made the remarkably favorable characterization:
Active competition among automobile manufacturers, although
some of them have made very large profits, gave to the public im-
proved products, often at substantially reduced prices. In the au-
tomobile industry this has been especially true of those manufac-
turers who are able to obtain large volume of production through
competitive improvement in motor vehicle construction, style, per-
formance, and safety, particularly in the low-priced class. Such
competition has been the basis for the remarkable growth of the in-
dustry.
Consumer benefits from competition in the automobile-manu-
facturing industry have probably been more substantial than in
any other large industry studied by the Commission.
36
Since World War II, few scholars have found equally kind words
as Donald Moore and Edward A. Mason, who conceded the automobile
industry a "remarkably good"'3  and a "relatively good"38  perfor-
mance." This article cannot scrutinize every sector of the car manu-
facturers' behavior and performance. However, if the industry's per-
formance could be characterized as generally agreeable, the possible
disadvantages of the current distribution system to the consumer would
appear in a decidedly milder light. Therefore, some sketchy remarks
about conduct and performance are necessary.4"
While collusive pricing behavior among the automobile producers is
not evident,41 the prices charged by all domestic firms in the industry
33. Note 4 supra.
34. See text accompanying notes 75-87 infra.
35. Note 51 infra.
36. FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY, H.R. Doc. No. 468,
76th Cong., 1st Sess., 1074 (1939) [hereinafter cited as FTC MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT].
37. Moore, The Automobile Industry in THE STRUcruE OF AMERICAN IN-
DUSTRY 274, 323 (W. Adams ed., rev. ed. 1954) [hereinafter cited as Moore].
38. Mason, The Current Status of the Monopoly Problem in the United States, 62
HARV. L. REv. 1265, 1282 (1949).
39. The positive evaluations may have been correct at the time. The industry
still contained eight domestic manufacturers, restyling ran at a slower pace, and soaring
profits could be explained as a natural consequence of the supply shortage during and
immediately after World War II.
40. For a fairly comprehensive account of the competitive situation in the auto-
mobile industry, see Hearings on the Question: Are Planning and Regulation Replacing
Competition in the American Economy? Before Subcomms. of the Senate Select Comm.
on Small Business, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) [hereinafter cited as Hearings, Planning,
Regulation and Competition].
41. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 11, at 346. Collusive suppres-
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are roughly similar for comparable cars. Adjustments of quoted prices
to those of competitiors are common.42  Parallel pricing policies and
formulas have led to an almost complete stifling of price competition.43
General Motors is obviously recognized as the price leader. It does not
behave like a true short-run profit maximizer but rather employs a
cost-plus-profit scheme-that is, a target pricing technique. 44  Direct
labor and material costs plus unit overhead costs are projected on the
basis of a normal or standard volume which is generally set at eighty
percent of capacity. 45 A twenty percent rate of return on net worth is
loaded on this synthetic unit cost. The pursuit of this pricing objective
is only feasible under the expectation that total industry demand, in-
dustry capacity and the respective market shares of the producers will
remain relatively constant. "What the competition is doing is taken
into account, but, it appears, almost as an after-thought. ' 4  Since de-
mand for new automobiles does not seem to be more than slightly
elastic with respect to prices47 and since price competition is virtually
nonexistent, the company's goal is to offer the public a highly devel-
oped car for an acceptable price rather than an acceptable car for the
lowest possible price. In determining the production costs, cost mini-
mization considerations are less important than a calculation of what
final price the market will bear. Costs are adjusted to this price minus
the established profit target. Lower costs tend to be passed to the con-
sumer in the form of improvements rather than in lower prices. 48  Ut-
most production efficiency under these circumstances would be aston-
sion was attacked in the field of the development of automotive emission control de-
vices. United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal.
1969).
42. See, e.g., Wall Street Journal, Oct. 22, 1956, at 6, col. 3; SuBcoMM. ON ANTI-
TRUST AND MONOPOLY OF THE COMM. ON TE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., 2ND SEss. RE-
PORT ON ADmNusTERED PRICES: AUTOMOBILES 61-65 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
REPORT, ADmNISERE PRICES].
43. For a detailed evaluation of the pricing behavior of the Big Three, see WmrTE,
supra note 3, at 105-35.
44. Wall Stree Journal, Dec. 10, 1957, at 1, col. 6 (How Auto Firms Figure
Their Costs to Reckon the Price Dealers Pay); L. Woss, ECONOMICS AND AMERI-
CAN INDUSTRY 355-56 (1961) [hereinafter cited as WEIsS].
45. But see Hearings, Planning, Regulation and Competition, supra note 40, at 218
(General Motors' Chevrolet division profit target related to approximately fifty-five
percent of maximum physical capacity); REPORT ADMINISTERED PRICES, supra note 42,
at 107, table 16.
46. WurT, supra note 3, at 112.
47. However, demand is sensitive with respect to income changes. See Atkin-
son, Consumer Markets for Durable Goods, 32 SuRveY OF CURRENT Bus., Apr. 1952, at
19; Suits, The Demand for New Automobiles in the United States 1929-1956, 50 REv.
ECON. & STATS., Aug. 1958, at 273.
48. Moore, supra note 37, at 321.
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ishing.40 The public is refused the choice between acceptable and
technologically advanced cars.
Unfortunately, any discomfort over the price rigidity and the price
determination methods used in the automobile industry is increased by
an observation of literally all discernible aspects of performance such
as profits, product quality and safety, and rate and pattern of progres-
siveness.5" The Big Three's profits during the last decade consistently
have exceeded rates of return which are deemed fair or normal for
manufacturing industries.51 Despite generous profits, no entry of a
domestic producer has taken place since the abortive attempt of Kaiser-
Frazer in 1945.
With the disappearance of price differentials on comparable mod-
els, nonprice competition assumes a very important role in the struggle
for an increased volume and market share. Since the early 1920s, fre-
quent model changes have become common. These changes require
retooling of production lines. Originally, model changes emerged from
significant developments in technology. Later, they became mostly
merchandising devices designed to enhance sales, coming in ever-
shorter periods. 2 In fact, model proliferation has reached the point
49. "Organization slack" is likely to occur. Hearings, Planning, Regulation and
Competition, supra note 40, at 919-20.
50. Sales promotion is not considered here because it is closely related to distri-
bution.
51. From 1957 to 1968, net income as a percentage of net worth for the four
domestic automobile manufacturers was as follows:
Source: Hearings, Giant Corporations, supra note 5, pt. Ia, at 729 (compiled from
MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL and from FORTUNE)
American Motors Chrysler Ford G.M.
1957 not available 16.38 12.78 17.51
1958 18.97 -4.89 5.02 12.82
1959 31.62 -0.80 17.26 16.50
1960 21.61 4.56 14.86 16.75
1961 10.45 1.57 13.09 14.82
1962 13.72 8.50 14.06 21.94
1963 13.84 17.55 13.14 22.35
1964 9.41 19.05 12.61 22.83
1965 1.95 14.75 15.65 18.51
1966 loss 11.12 12.98 20.55
1967 loss 10.92 1.83 17.57
1968 not available 7.61 8.07 9.93
(6 months)
This comparison might be deemed inconclusive because of special risk rewards that
must be conceded to the automobile industry. However, risk rewards do not play an
important part in the automobile industry. Moreover, the argument would not explain
why GM with the least vulnerable position earns even higher profits than Ford and
Chrysler.
52. For a recent examination of the competitive impact of annual model changes
and its antitrust policy implications see Note, Annual Style Change in the Automobile
Industry as an Unfair Method of Competition, 80 YALE L.J. 567 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Annual Style Changes].
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that it can hardly be explained by consumer demand. 53 The enormous
expenditures for model changes54 are reflected only to a miniscule de-
gree in real improvements.5 5  The Big Three claim that a great deal of
innovation has been going on in the industry, providing the customer
with higher value, more safety and greater reliability of his car. Cer-
tainly, the public has received an improved car over years. However,
"an industry's progressiveness can be properly evaluated only in terms
of how progressive it has been relative to its opportunities. The ques-
tion is how well it has exploited the available opportunities for inven-
tion and innovation."'5 6 Most recent technological improvement came
from outside the big firms. Small producers and component suppliers
have done more than a proportionate share of pioneering.57 This dis-
neal record has carried over into safety, expense of repair and reliabil-
ity.58 Despite this crude compilation of industry performance, one
conclusion can be drawn. The structure of the industry has paralyzed
the strive for agreeable performance to a regrettable degree.
Barriers to Entry in the Automobile Industry
Certainly no direct regression line-no one-to-one relationship-
exists between the vigor of competition and the number of firms in an
industry. An addition of one or two independent competitors might
hardly be felt in terms of performance. However, a given industry is
53. "Last year a Yale University physicist calculated that since Chevy offered 46
models, 32 engines, 20 transmissions, 21 colors (plus nine two-tone combinations) and
more than 400 accessories and options, the number of different cars that a Chevrolet
customer conceivably could order was greater than the number of atoms in the universe.
This seemingly would put General Motors one notch higher than God in the chain of
command. This year, even though the standard Chevrolet never accounts for less than
two-thirds of Chevy's sales, Chevy is offering still more models (a total of 50) and op-
tions, indicating that while they may not be increasing their lead over Ford, they are
pulling away from God." Higdon, The Big Auto Sweepstakes, N.Y. Times, May 1,
1966, § 6 (Magazine), 36 at 97.
54. $1.56 billion or about $195 per automobile in 1969. Annual Style Changes,
supra note 52, at 576, 577 n.45.
55. Id. But see Moore, supra note 37, at 299 (suggesting this is due in part to
the public's being wary of radical or experimental changes).
56. BAiN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 11, at 419.
57. REPORT, ADMINISTERED PiucS, supra note 42, at 24; WHrr, supra note 3, at
258. Examples of innovations which orignated outside the Big Three are: the auto-
matic transmission, the all-steel body, hydraulic valve lifters, four wheel brakes and
adjustable seat belts. More recent innovations include the disc brake and Wankel
engine. But see Senator Dirksen's dissent, REPORT, ADMINISTERED PRIcEs, supra note
42, at 280-81.
58. See Hearings, Planning, Regulation and Competition, supra note 40, at 470
recording Ralph Nader's testimony that the Chevrolet Corvette is so expensive to repair
that General Motors owned GM Motor Insurance Company will only write policies
on the Corvette at very high prices. See generally id. at 471-96.
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likely to behave less interdependently and perform noticeably better
with eight or ten relatively small competitors than with three giant com-
petitors. This is provided that the size of the three competitors is not
required by economies of scale as a minimum for optimal efficiency.
Undoubtedly, technological requirements prohibit a splitting of
the automobile industry into atomistic units. Therefore, "[a] law re-
quiring that the automobile industry consist of 50 or 100 firms and
have a standardized product would be in the same category with a law
preventing the tide from coming in."" However, three studies lead
to the conclusion that the minimum optimal scale in the automo-
bile industry would allow roughly a dozen efficient competitors. 60  The
first of these studies was conducted by Bain. He based his estimates of
optimal scale on survey questionnaire responses from officials of the
firms engaged in the automobile industry.6 His main finding with re-
spect to scale economies was that an optimal plant complex in the auto
industry would have to be designed for a production of 300,000 to
600,000 units per year. At the time of his study, this production
would approximate five to ten percent of the annual national output.
Even if the minimum optimal scale has increased over the years,
62
Bain's findings imply that ten to twenty optimally sized firms could
operate profitably in the industry.
Since the firms in the automobile industry were not interested in
publicizing their plant and firm scale curves, Bain could not determine
exactly their leftward slopes. However, he reported that 300,000 units
per annum was a low estimate of that needed for productive efficiency
in any one line. There are probably added advantages up to 600,000
units.63 At an output of 150,000 units per year, costs are moderately
higher than at 300,000 to 600,000 units, but annual production below
60,000 units is clearly uneconomical. 64 Moreover, Bain indicated that
59. WEISS, supra note 44, at 373.
60. BAIN, BARRIERS, supra note 21, at 244-47; WHrrE, supra note 3, at 286; Hear-
ings on Administered Prices, Automobiles Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust Trust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 6, at 2851
(1958) [hereinafter cited as Hearings, Administered Prices]. But see G. MAXcY & A.
SILBERSTON, THE MOTOR INDUSTRY 82 (1959) (estimating optimal output to be one
million units per year).
61. BAIN, BARRIERS, supra note 21, at 49-51.
62. Before World War II, 250,000 units were sufficient to make full use of spe-
cial tools. Paul Hoffman, then president of Studebaker, testified that 110,000 units
would permit competition with the Big Three. Hearings Before the Temporary Natl
Economic Comm., 76th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 21, at 11218 (1940).
63. BAIN, BARRIERS, supra note 21, at 245.
64. Id. Achieving a great deal more competition in the automobile industry
may require higher costs per unit. Therefore, a more reliable description of the left-
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"the critical stage in plant economies is evidently found in the produc-
tion of coponents and not in assembly. In assembly alone, from
60,000 to 180,000 units per annum is considered optimal ... .
This, of course, is not to say that entry as an assembler is still as feasible
as in the 1910s.
The second study on scale economies was presented by George
Romney, then president of American Motors.6 6 Based on studies con-
ducted by his company, he testified that a minimum optimal scale plant
would produce 180,000 to 220,000 units annually, including engines
and bodies:
A company that can build between 180,000 and 220,000 cars a
year on a 1-shift basis can make a very good profit and not take a
back seat to anyone in the industry in production efficiency ....
[M]y point is that when you get up to 180,000 to 200,000
cars a year, the cost reduction flattens out, from a manufacturing
cost standpoint, and from 360,000 to 400,000 on up it is a neg-
ligible thing....
So all this talk about the disadvantage of lack of volume in
relationship to tooling costs is grossly exaggerated.6 7
Romney concluded by saying that on a two shift basis, an annual pro-
duction of 360,000 to 440,000 units would achieve additional small
economies. However, beyond that volume only theoretical and insig-
nificant reductions in manufacturing costs were possible. 68
In tune with these earlier estimates of scale economies is White's
determination.6 While an optimal rate in final assembly was found to
be between 200,000 to 250,000 units a year on a two shift basis and
while the casting process seemed to be adaptable to most otherwise
feasible scales of production, it "is in stamping, where the best sheet
metal dies have useful lives of around 400,000 stampings, that the larg-
est volume economies are to be found."70 However, White added risk
considerations as a new dimension to his scale determination, main-
taining that the survival chances for a firm vastly improve if the firm
can rest its fate on two pillars. "The minimum efficient size to ensure
survival in the long run, then, is a firm manufacturing somewhere
around 800,000 units a year, split into two makes of 400,000 units
each. . . . Ihe major benefit would be from the diversification of
ward slope of the scale curve would be desirable. For an attempt at such a descrip-
lion, see WmTE, supra note 3, at 39.
65. BAiN, BARRIES, supra note 21, at 245.
66. Hearings, Administered Prices, supra note 60, pt. 6, at 2342-2988.
67. Id. at 2851-53.
68. Id. at 2851.
69. WHITE, supra note 3, at 38-53.
70. Id. at 38.
.April 1973]
risk."'" This introduction of a risk diversification element is sound
under current market conditions. After a structural remedy has split
the industry into a dozen firms of about equal size, it would become ir-
relevant. But even nowadays, the lower estimate is not incompatible
with the competitive situation in the automobile industry: a survival
possibility as opposed to a survival insurance should be sufficient to
induce entry if there were no additional barriers.
If these estimates are approximately correct, the sizes of the Big
Three are not necessitated by technological requirements and econo-
mies of scale. At first glance, the other impression might be that in
light of the minimum volume required, entry for a domestic newcomer
would be feasible. Nonetheless, since World War II only Kaiser Mo-
tor Company seriously attempted to enter. This attempt failed. En-
tering at a time of nearly unsatiable postwar demand, Kaiser seemed
assured of success. It commanded the talents of experienced execu-
tives, the backing of a multimillion dollar industrial empire and the in-
herited production and distribution facilities of Graham-Paige Motors,
an operative automobile organization. Through stock offerings, loans
from private and government agencies and financial resources derived
from other Kaiser enterprises $100 million were raised. Within eleven
months Kaiser produced a car which was praised for its engineering
achievement and proved to be a style leader. Its market share rose to
nearly five percent of industry sales by 1948. Yet, the venture was
doomed to fail, and by 1954-nine years after entry-Kaiser withdrew
from production.72
The reasons for Kaiser's failure strikingly demonstrate that a
minimum scale of production is not the only barrier to entry for domes-
tic newcomers. Many factors contributed. Consumer acceptance ac-
tually decreased over several years, leading to a drop in volume and
scale economy disadvantages. Kaiser was unable to finance the
launching of a new model in 1950. The trade-in values of Kaiser cars
were considerably inferior to those of the established producers. Fi-
nally, Kaiser failed to establish an effective nationwide network of
financially strong and sufficiently experienced automobile dealers to
promote sales and offer services."3 "The new entrant concern was,
after the first couple of years, absorbing increasing operating losses
71. Id. at 49-50.
72. Id. at 67-72; Annual Style Change, supra note 52, at 586-87.
73. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 11, at 285; WHITE, supra note 3,
at 68-70; Lanzillotti, The Automobile Industry, in W. ADAMS, THE S'rucrTuE OF AMER-
ICAN INDHSTRY 311, 328-29 (3d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Lanzillotti]; Annual
Style Change, supra note 52, at 587-88.
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ranging upward from $10 million annually, and apparently at last de-
cided not to throw further good money after bad in an attempt to es-
tablish a foothold in the industry.
'74
Since Kaiser's exit, the enormous capital requirements for meet-
ing the scale economies in production and retail distribution as well as
the massive sales promotion outlays for establishing consumer accep-
tance of the new product have not declined. On the contrary, George
Romney's estimates from 1958 seem to be fairly conservative: $576
million for a newcomer based on an annual production of 250,000 au-
tomobiles. 7  On the basis of producing 800,000 units annually, White
estimated the capital requirements of a new entrant at slightly over one
billion dollars.76  In addition to this, the capital requirement for a
dealer and distributor network was estimated to be $326.2 million.
77
In the past, these requirements have been supplied by the dealers them-
selves. Nevertheless, it seems appropriate to include part of this sum
in the total.78  The wholesale level has become fully integrated by the
Big Three.79  An entrant may also need to duplicate another concept
of the Big Three: the establishment of some factory-owned or sup-
ported retail stores in strategically important locations. Moreover, be-
cause the financially strong dealer potential is allegedly absorbed pri-
marily by the established producers 0 and because interfactory dealer-
ships are rather rare,' a newcomer would have to back its dealerbody
with loans during the starting phase of contractual forward integration.
Thus, barriers to entry have increased since Kaiser's abortive attempt at
entry. These barriers are heightened by the necessity to establish a
distribution network.
In the light of Kaiser's experience and the exorbitant sums neces-
sary to enter, potential newcomers hardly will feel encouraged to start
production. Economists have concluded that barriers to entry in the
74. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 11, at 285.
75. REPORT, ADMINISTERED PRIcES, supra note 42, at 17, table L
76. WHITE, supra note 3, at 61.
77. REPORT, ADMINISTERED PRIcEs, supa note 42, at 16 n.28 (based on a
dealer body of 3,500 members). 2,500 to 3,000 dealers are necessary for national
coverage. WEISS, supra note 44, at 343.
78. Contra, Lanzillotti, supra note 73, at 328.
79. Even American Motors has taken the first step towards bypassing the tradi-
tional middleman distribution concept by delivering parts and accessories directly to the
dealer. AuroMoTIvE NEWS, Mar. 20, 1972, at 1 (AMC to Bypass Wholesalers with
New Aftermarket Line).
80. Mueller, Sources of Monopoly Power: A Phenomenon Called "Product Dif-
ferentiation", 2 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REv. Summer 1969, at 80-81 [hereinafter cited
as Mueller].
81. See note 166 infra.
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automobile industry are "very high and perhaps insuperable," 2 "im-
pregnable," 3 and "almost insurmountable. '8 4  "Billion dollar corpora-
tions are not common phenomena, and forming one from scratch would
be virtually impossible. . . . The high risks of entry and the dismal
history of past attempts would surely scare away even the most intrepied
investors. . . . On absolute capital cost requirement alone, one can
consider entry at an efficient scale as effectively blockaded."85  Even
if the capital requirements for entry were met, the newcomer would,
during the first decade of its operation, probably incur product differ-
entiation disadvantages that could easily amount to fifteen million dol-
lars or more break-in losses annually-all invested without any guar-
antee of ultimate success.8 6 Only small assemblers of special sport
cars might be able to secure a tiny comer of the market, but they can-
not be considered a serious contribution to stronger competition in the
passenger car industry. Representatives of companies which have de-
veloped alternative automobile propulsion systems have unanimously
agreed in their testimony before congressional committees that entry by
firms offering such innovations is not economically feasible. 7
Some Remedy Considerations
The first reaction to the competitive situation in the automobile
industry is the suggestion of a structural remedy. The Big Three could
be broken into parts small enough to assure competitively more aggres-
sive behavior and better performance. However, two factors must be
considered. First, speedy antitrust action, even if based on solid legal
ground, is wasted if the proposed remedies are not thoroughly consid-
ered in light of all their ramifications. Merely busting up the Big
Three or only General Motors might easily prove useless. Accompany-
mng measures would have to be taken regarding the companies' interre-
lations with their financing companies, their distribution systems and
their vertical backward integration. The result of an ill-formulated
remedy decree in the early Tobacco case 8 should remain as a constant
82. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 11, at 287.
83. Hearings, Planning, Regulation and Competition, supra note 40, at 907.
84. Id. at 920 n.6. See also WEISS, supra note 44, at 377 (speaking of virtual ex-
clusion of new firms).
85. WHITE, supra note 3, at 61.
86. BAIN, BARRIERS, supra note 21, at 307-8; BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION,
supra note 11, at 286-87.
87. Annual Style Change, supra note 52, at 590. Only a radical change in
technology or a significant lowering of raw material costs might reduce the necessary
scales of entry and accordingly the capital requirements. WITE, supra note 3, at 64.
88. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
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warning. 89  Second, the dissolution of one or all of the Big Three,
however commendable from a long-run economic standpoint, is a hot
political question. For example, in 1967, Assistant Attorney General
Donald F. Turner was prepared for an antitrust suit against General
Motors but was stopped by President Johnson's disapproval.90 The
prepared litigation would have focused on early General Motors' mer-
gers. It was directed towards splitting off the Chevrolet Division plus
perhaps one or two assembly divisions and enough parts manufactur-
ing and other facilities to make the split-off companies effective com-
petitors.
Even if this intended legal action had proven successful, having
four giants in the place of three provides no advantage. The social
gain, however, might have been found in an attack on General Motors'
widely recognized superior efficiency as compared with Ford and
Chrysler. This seems to be an utterly puzzling statement since superior
efficiency-within limits-normally is regarded as very desirable.
However, General Motors, perhaps in fear of antitrust actions91 in case
of an increase of its market share considerably above the fifty percent
border, seems to have never fully exploited its efficiency. The recog-
nition of this superiority, reflected in the consistently higher profit mar-
gins, might have convinced Ford and Chrysler that passive or reactive
behavior might fit their role better than not accepting General Motors
as the leader in terms of prices and style changes. On a level of ap-
proximately equal efficiency, it might be vaguely hoped that the other
firms become more active and aggressive within the limits of the still
present oligopolistic interdependence.
As an alternative to a structural remedy, the foreign competitors
89. "One complaint against the decree concerned the continued position of the
Trust owners as major stockholders in all the successor companies: 'The main feature
of the plan is to divide the corporation... into three parts; these three parts [will] be
owned by the same persons, in the same proportions, and to be controlled by the same
individuals [whom] the Supreme Court held to have combined in a violation of the
law....
Furthermore, the distribution of brands according to the plants whch manufactured
them resulted in initial monopolies in various branches of the industry." R. TENNANT,
Tim AMEImcAN CIGARETTE INDusTY 64 (1950), quoting from Brandeis, An Illegal
Trust Legalized, 21 WoRLD To-DAY 1440 (1911). Indeed, there is ample evidence
that industry performance did not improve after dissolution on the Trust. See American
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
90. See Hearings, Planning, Regulation and Competition, supra note 40, at 253-
54 (testimony of Ralph Nader).
91. Shubik, A Game Theorist Looks at the Antitrust Laws and the Automobile In-
dustry, 8 STAN L. REv. 594, 625 (1956). For possible business reasons, see Moore,
supra note 37, at 315.
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could be relied upon to wake and shake up the sleeping giants. 92  In-
deed, some recent improvements in American automobiles are cer-
tainly the result of the introduction of innovations to the American
public by European or Japanese manufacturers. Presently, the Ameri-
can consumer is given a choice between big, luxurious flagships and
small, handy and thrifty compact cars. Amazingly enough, the im-
ports have not turned out to be "in the long run unlikely to capture
more than a limited corner of the American market. . . ...1 Their
market share has been steadily increasing since 1962, and even after a
short dropback due to President Nixon's incisive economic strategy in
1971, they have almost regained their old strength.
94
However, no exclusive reliance should be placed on the competi-
tive stimulation provided by foreign producers. In a world of very del-
icate monetary balance and economic interconnection, foreign manu-
facturers tend to be especially sensitive and vulnerable to import ag-
gravations. Furthermore, as a matter of general political consideration,
backing domestic industry is certainly preferable to feeding foreigners.
If, therefore, improvements in price-competitive vigor and consumer-
biased performance can conceivably be derived from changes at home,
any promising suggestion should be followed without hesitation.
In the previous discussion of the desirability, necessity and availa-
bility of direct structural remedies, little has been said about one crucial
barrier to entry in the automobile industry-product differentiation.
If the current distribution system noticeably contributes to product dif-
ferentiation and thereby to the height of existing entry barriers, one
might be intrigued to think of entirely new ways of distribution. An
erosion of existing product differentiation and the resultant height of
entry barriers, however, is a very lengthy process, and temporary func-
tion breakdowns of the distribution might be considered too high a
price for a faintly improved long-run prospect of successful domestic
entry. Therefore, equal consideration should be given to the impact of
the distribution system on the current competition-for instance, whether
this system stifles intrabrand competition or unduly hinders consumers in
gaining access to cars and services.
92. See AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Mar. 20, 1972, at 26.
93. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 11, at 287; accord, Hearings.
Planning, Regulation and Competition, supra note 40, at 920 n.6.






Product differentiation is one source of barriers to entry. Sup-
posedly it is not the least important source. To the extent that product
differentiation exists, a seller has latitude to raise its price above that of
its interbrand competitor-actual or potential-without losing a sub-
stantial number of customers.95 That is, the consumer prefers the
seller's brand over that of a competitor even though a price differential
exists. The sources of this preference within an industry are manifold.
They include: physical product differences in both quality and design,
buyer ignorance which leads to reliance on seller or product reputation,
persuasive sales promotion activities, and the prestige motif dccom-
panying conspicuous consumption goods. 96 All of these sources seem
to be operative to a certain degree in the automobile industry.9 7 How-
ever, a special contribution is made by the retail sector of the industry:
"A final important basis of product differentiation in the automobile in-
dustry is found in the nationwide systems of retail distributors and
connected service garages which the established sellers control."98s
The History of the Automobile Retail Distribution System
The early automobile industry was characterized by tremendous
growth and the unusually rapid turnover of manufacturers. Between
1910 and 1921, ninety-six entrances and seventy-seven exits took place,
culminating in an all-time record of eighty-eight producers. 99 Qver
this twelve year period, the industry failure rate was 8.5 percent.'00
This rate was considerably higher than the 0.4 to 1.1 percent rate ex-
perienced in other manufacturing, trading and commercial pursuits. 10'
One explanation for this phenomenon was the extremely fragile capital
basis of most manufacturers. Commercial bankers viewed the young
industry with distrust and were more than reluctant to make loans for
such extravagant endeavors. The undercapitalization of virtually the
whole industry' 02 necessitated that the producers not tie up money in
95. Entry barriers are obstacles for prospective competitors as well as aggrava-
tions for existing small competitors. Product differentiation often stabilizes market
shares. This in turn supports the stability of oligopolistic market structures as well as
entry forestalling effects.
96. For details see BAiN, INDuszT.AL ORGANZATION, supra note 11, at 226.
97. Id. at 228.
98. Id. at 242.
99. EpsmiN, supra note 2, at 176, chart 28; SELTZER, supra note 2, at 65, table 5.
100. See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 177.
101. Id.
102. Ford was officially capitalized with 100,000 dollars, but no more than 28,000
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inventory. They demanded payment in full in delivery. No general dis-
tribution pattern had emerged. The producers experimented with every
distribution device that met their basic needs.1"3 The demand situation
was such that consumers were willing to pay considerable cash deposits,
sometimes even the full price, upon placing their orders.10 4 The distribu-
tors, often endowed with exclusive selling rights in huge territories,0 5
passed these payments to the manufacturer who shipped cars immedi-
ately upon production. Later on, when some kind of orderly agency
distribution device evolved, manufacturers required their dealers and
distributors'0 6 to make considerable cash deposits which guaranteed
the faithful performance under the terms of the agreement. 1 7 Perfor-
mance deposits often financed half of a full year's production. 08 In
the early 1920s the automobile retail level evolved from a ready cash
market for undercapitalized manufacturers to an elaborately cultivated
and thoroughly controlled device. The retail level became part of the
manufacturers' struggle for optimal market penetration. Improved
production techniques coupled with increased investments rapidly ex-
panded manufacturing capacities. Capacities finally exceeded effective
consumer demand.' 0 9 Big volume sales became crucial for the effi-
cient use of the plant capacities. To induce such sales, the manufac-
turers initiated more rapid model changes which were aimed at increas-
ing the frequency of new car purchases-the planned obsolescence
strategy. This development of replacement demand resulted in mount-
ing used car inventories. In order to meet manufacturer-imposed new
car quotas, dealers began making unrealistic trade-in allowances which
severely threatened their profitability.-" The proposition that the
more cars the factory delivered the more profit the dealer earned was
no longer true.
The manufacturers answered growing dealer dissatisfaction in a
different manner, but the basic aims were the same. A shift to a direct
dollars were ever paid into the treasury of the company. SELTZER, supra note 2, at 88
n.5. Hudson Company started with less than 15,000 dollars. KENNEDY, supra note
2, at 68.
103. HEWITT, AUTOMOBILE FRANCHISE AGREEMENTS 19 (Indiana University
School of Business Study No. 39, 1956) [hereinafter cited as HEwlTT].
104. Id. at 15.
105. Id. at 21 n.38, reporting individual distributors with territories such as the
New England states and southern California.
106. Distributors were responsible for the cultivation of their exclusive territories
by a network of dealers.
107. HEwTrr, supra note 103, at 16; EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 139-40.
108. SELTZER, supra note 2, at 21.
109. HEwrTT, supra note 103, at 62; SELTZER, supra note 2, at 59.
110. Dealers lost over 40 million dollars on used car trade-ins in 1923. KEN-
NEDY, supra note 2, at 140.
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dealer marketing approach took place, at least in the low-priced, high-
volume lines. The general elimination of middlemen--distributors-
was to facilitate tighter supervision, more effective volume pushing and
better checks on the general dealer performance. Moreover, the manu-
facturers, especially the leading firms, required their dealers to drop
competing brands. Thus, networks of exclusive dealers became domi-
nant in the industry.
Only firms with a good model variety, a sound equity basis and a
strong dealer network survived the Depression. The Big Three made
their decisive breakthrough as the number of car producers and deal-
ers dropped sharply.111 The chaotic price structure on the retail level
was partially responsible for the failure of many dealers of smaller
producers. This price condition could not be fully stabilized by the
National Industry Recovery Act of 1933112 and its dealer code pre-
scribing ceilings on trade-in allowances. After the demise of the
NIRA in 1935, the dealers' attempts to preserve the benefit of limited
price competition by self-regulation were successfully prevented by the
manufacturers. 1 3  The development of the manufacturer-dealer rela-
tionship was summarized by the Federal Trade Commission in 1939."1
It stressed that "supervision of dealer activities has become an integral
part of the competition among manufacturers for volume of sales, as
evidenced by the close check kept by manufacturers over the perform-
ance of dealers through their ten-day or other periodic reports on
sales." 135 Moreover, the commission's report stated that "[t]he prac-
tice has grown up for manufacturers to insist that their dealers shall not
handle competing automobiles, accessories, or repair parts made by
other manufacturers; in other words, that the dealer shall give exclusive
representation to one manufacturer's line.""1 6  The commission con-
cluded that evidence of antitrust violation could not be determined
from the language of the contracts alone. However, several contrac-
tual provisions were cited as possibly "lend[ing] themselves to illegal
practices. 1" 7  Significantly, clauses prescribing exclusive representa-
tion and territorial protection were among the cited provisions.118
Although several exclusiveness provisions in dealer franchise con-
111. See -Ewrrr, supra note 103, at 90-92.
112. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, 73 Stat. 195.
113. J PAL.kMouNTArN, JR., THE PoLIics op DISTBRmUTION 122-28 (1955).
114. FTC MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT, supra note 36.
115. Id. at 113.
116. Id. at 110.
117. FrC MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT, supra note 36, at 136.
118. Id.
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tracts later succumbed to the side effects of judicial decisions or the
disapproval of the Justice Department, franchise agreements have con-
tinued to be one-sided throughout their post-war history. However, the
language of the contracts does not tell the whole story. The fact that
automobile dealer profits have ranked well above the average for retail
businesses induced at least one economist to conclude that manufac-
turers have not succeeded in fully exploiting their superior economic
power and rights under the franchise agreement.119 Consumer-dealer-
ship attachments and possible scale economies in the distribution of
cars probably are responsible for this. 120  Today, the manufacturer-
dealer relationship apparently is penetrated by knowledge of their mu-
tual interdependence. Surely, the more money a dealer has invested
in his enterprise the more dependent he is on his supplier. The manu-
facturer can exert control much easier. Still, losing valuable dealers to
the network of a competitor is utterly abhorred by every manufacturer.
Because of this, manufacturers generally exercise control via induce-
ments, not through threats.' 21 Still, the franchised automobile distri-
bution system is firmly entrenched and somewhat similar to a medieval
guild system.'
22
The Reasons for the Adoption of the Franchised Distribution System
Without exception, the American automobile manufacturers have
chosen a restrictive franchise system of distribution. It is restrictive be-
cause it limits the number of outlets in contrast to selling cars to every-
body who would place orders and pay cash for them. However, the
question of why the companies continue to rely on the franchise system
has not yet been answered satisfactorily. The early history of the in-
dustry might have necessitated the use of independent businessmen in
the distribution process, especially for financial reasons.' 23  However,
119. B. PASHIGIAN, THE DISTRIBUTION OF AUTOMOBILES, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF THE FRANCHISE SYSTEM 34-36 (1961) [hereinafter cited as PASHIGIAN].
120. Id.
121. See AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, April 10, 1972, at 1, col. 2 (Six Divisions Offer
Incentives to Keep Spring Sales Strong); Heaings, Giant Corporations, supra note 5,
at 77-88.
122. Excellent insight into the delicately balanced interdependence between a car
manufacturer and his dealer network is provided by United States v. General Motors
Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966). About a dozen Chevrolet dealers in the Los Angeles area
allegedly threatened the viability of other Chevrolet franchisees by selling through dis-
count houses. Upon demand by, and with the assistance of individual dealers and
dealer associations, General Motors interfered. Within several months, the campaign
to eliminate discounters and other referral outlets from commerce in new Chevrolets
was a success. See also Marx, Your Right to a Car Bargain, 196 TIlE NATION 195
(1963).
123. See text accompanying notes 99-108 supra.
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as control over dealers became increasingly important, the producers
did not switch to an agency system.'2 4 Such a system would have had
the intrinsic advantage of allowing full control without fear of antitrust
objections.1
25
Arguably, a switch to factory-branch retailing would be prohibi-
tively costly for every car manufacturer. 126  Indeed, the investment
figures in the distribution system of the automobile industry are im-
pressive. Kessler reports that in 1954 the investment of an average
dealer amounted to $118,000. The overall investment of the then
42,000 dealers approached $5 billion. 127  While the number of domes-
tic dealerships have shrunk to about two-thirds of the 1954 figure, the
average investment per dealership has increased to approximately
$163,000.128 The net worth of General Motors' car dealers has been
estimated to be in excess of 2 billion dollars. 29  Unquestionably, buy-
ing out all dealerships at one time would be financially crushing for the
manufacturers. On the other hand, since the 1920s at least the Big
Three have acquired sufficient capital to engage in a continuous proc-
ess of establishing factory-operated outlets. For example, if General
Motors had employed all the financial resources used for the Franchise
Investment Plan it could have bought a good portion of existing dealer-
ships, while also establishing new agencies. Moreover, in connection
with their retailing plans, all of the Big Three have been busy buying
real estate and erecting huge buildings in first-rate locations.' 30 Nev-
ertheless, none of the Big Three has ever seriously attempted to turn
to the agency form of distribution as a marketing device.
It is difficult to determine whether the manufacturers regarded
resources put into distribution as inefficient. More profitable markets
for funds may have been found. This is not to say that the retailing of
124. See text accompanying notes 109-111 supra.
125. See United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926). But see
Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 319-21 (1949) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting).
126. Interview with Robert Chatov, former professor of Business Administration, in
Berkeley, California, in November 1971. Professor Chatov worked with the Ford
Motor Company for twelve years.
127. Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract, 66
YALE L.J. 1135, 1137 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Kessler].
128. Hearings on Unfair Competition and Discriminatory Automobile Marketing
Practices Before the Special Subcomm. on Automobile Marketing Practices of the Sen-
ate Comm. on Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 84, at 3 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings, Unfair Competition].
129. A. SLOAN, JR., My YEA~s wrrH GENERAL MOTORs 297 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as SLOAN]. See also WrTE, supra note 3, at 320 n.23 (Average dealer invest-
ment in 1967 was $169,000).
130. Hearings, Unfair Competition, supra note 128, at 9.
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cars on the whole is unprofitable. If it were, dealer turnover would be
much more rapid, and there would be no waiting lists for Ford and
General Motors franchises.' However, a financial commitment to the
distribution level would be very inflexible. Once an agency system is
established, there would be no real alternative other than to use it.
Moreover, the present franchise system allows the manufacturers to
achieve nearly perfect control over the distribution process without as-
suming legal responsibility. The dealers' small remainder of economic
freedom causes some planning uncertainty for the manufacturers.
However, the elimination of this freedom may not have been deemed
to be worth the huge investment necessary to establish an agency net-
work.
A second argument advanced for the adoption of a franchise sys-
tem is that the administration of a factory-operated distribution system
would tend to be rather clumsy and inflate unnecessarily the manu-
facturer's administrative body. Performing the wholesale functions of
distribution by fully integrated units would be enough of a burden.
This argument claims diseconomies of large scale in the administration
of a corporation. However, such claims overlook the fact that the em-
ployment of a franchise system does not liberate the manufacturer from
administrative and supervision burdens. The dealer reports, which are
expected every ten to thirty days, have to be analyzed; each dealer's
performance must be evaluated individually. One of the main features
in the current distribution system is that the manufacturers try to fore-
cast and to influence market developments with meticulous accuracy.
The members of the automobile industry try to eliminate haphazard mar-
keting elements.' 3 2  Therefore, constantly revised market surveys are
made regardless of the type of distribution system. Checking dealer
performance, sometimes claimed to inflate administration costs, is bas-
ically as expensive as the preparation, consummation and control of an
efficient agency distribution system. Nevertheless, the claims of in-
creased administration costs have some merit. Roughly 700,000 per-
sons are employed by the domestic car distribution system.' 3 3 Having
them as factory employees would cause a tremendous record keeping
effort, not to mention difficulties in initial selection.
In addition to costs of creation and administration, a factory-
owned distribution system would subject the manufacturer to new risks.
When the used car trade-in became important, an element of trading
131. See PASHIGIAN, supra note 119, at 11. Ford and General Motors have never
advertised directly to attract dealers. WHITE, supra note 3, at 148.
132. GALBRArrH, supra note 9, at 16.
133. Hearings, Unfair Competition, supra note 128, at 3.
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was added to the distribution function. This was accompanied by
risks and problems that the manufacturers did not want to assume.
They avoided any direct to the consumer distribution plan, thus avoid-
ing the opportunity for more exact retail price maintenance. It is this
trading element rather than the necessity to supervise the performance
of every single outlet that Sloan had in mind when he stated: "Or-
ganizing and supervising the necessary thousands of complex trading
institutions would have been difficult for the manufacturer; trading is
a knack not easy to fit into the conventional type of a managerially con-
trolled scheme of organization.""',
More importantly, while avoiding this risk, the franchise system
provides incentive for dealer performance. Due to his enormous finan-
cial commitment, the owner of a dealership will just try harder. A
branch manager, however capable he might be, has neither his income
nor his investment at stake. The only penalty for his business mistakes
or lack of initiative is the loss of his job.135  Also, since the franchise
holder has his resources involved, he contributes to sales promotion
costs which otherwise would have to be borne by the manufacturer
alone.136 Thus, in the areas of risk,13' performance and sales promotion,
the franchise distribution system offers advantages over a factory-
operated system.
Another reason for the adoption and deliberate continuation of
the franchise system is the fact that most dealers are members of the
community where they sell. They can develop much more personal
contact with their customers than a foreign branch manager. To a
certain degree, consumer attachment to a dealership is the outflow of
personal relations to the owner. Even if the public sometimes does not
distinguish between agencies and independent company representa-
tives, many a customer does consider whether the head of the outlet is
a community fellow or some "foreigner." By setting up its own dis-
tribution system, the manufacturer would lose "the advantage of being
represented in the community by 'good old Joe Doakes, rather than a
faceless corporation.' "138 The established dealer's personal image and
reputation tends to be projected on the manufacturer's image and is
134. SLOAN, supra note 129, at 282.
135. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 135-36.
136. The average dealer spends more than $12,000 annually for local advertising.
The total advertising budget for all franchised automobile dealers in the United States
is nearly $400 million. Hearings, Unfair Competition, supra note 128, at 3. See also
AuToMOTIVE NEws, Aug. 7, 1972, at 1, col. 3.
137. See PASHIGIAN, supra note 119, at 97; WHIrE, supra note 3, at 137.
138. Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution under the Sherman Act, 75 HAnv. L.
REV. 795, 806 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Restricted Channels].
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subject to much more social check than a branch manager who neither
personally nor geographicaly identifies with the community. This ar-
gument might be more convincing in rural areas, but it certainly holds
generally.
Two closely interlinked reasons may also bear a relation to the
manufacturers' decision to maintain a franchise distribution system.
Independent dealers are obligated to buy-and sell-certain quotas.
These dealers furnish a ready cash market. They generally pay the
manufactuer's wholesale price without regard to current market fluctu-
ations. Price conditions at the retail level do not bother the manufac-
turer unless they tend to have a disastrous long-run effect on the whole
distribution system-for example, overall losses to dealers due to un-
realistic demand/supply/price determinations. Therefore, dealers can
be forced to absorb at least part of the costs resulting from overpro-
duction or styling errors.' 1 9 These costs would have to be borne by
the manufacturer alone in any factory-operated retailing system.
Reasons for the Adoption of a Restrictive Franchise System
The preceding discussion has explained why the car manufactur-
ers favor a franchise retail system. What remains is to ascertain why
the number of retail outlets has been limited by the manufacturers. If
the manufacturers responded to every order of an individual who is
willing to pay cash for an automobile, the distribution process would
become a horrible mess. The administration of such a system would
be unduly costly. Delivery costs would be inflated. Moreover, the
companies would have to perform the dealers' duty of car preparation
at the factory. Large amounts of money would be necessary to stock
the cars, whether near the factories or in several large wholesale outlets.
A network of strategically located retailers alleviates all these burdens.
This, however, does not answer the question why all applications
for the establishment of full-dressed dealerships are not positively con-
sidered. There is certainly a big difference between the number of
those who would order a car for their private use and those who seri-
ously want to go into the car retail business. Nevertheless, econo-
mies of scale at the distribution level mitigate against a manufacturer
granting too many franchises. When two dealers operate in an area
and economies of scale cannot be exhausted by either, distribution
costs may be increased. This may lead to the eventual loss of at least
one dealer, a possible disruption in the selling process and a breakdown
139. Styling errors are more detrimental for a manufacturer of fewer models. See
PASHIGIAN, supra note 119, at 97.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24
THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
of consumer-dealership attachments. Additionally, limiting the num-
ber of dealers is likely to channel retail competition into nonprice
forms. Since the importance of dealer personality probably will dimin-
ish in a price emphasizing market, the current franchise system pre-
serves consumer-dealer attachment. This unquestionably benefits the
manufacturer. 140
Furthermore, unlimited entry into the retail network would
weaken the manufacturer's ability to protect existing dealers from losses
resulting from unexpected shifts in demand.14' In turn, the profit
basis for dealers would be weaker. This result would tend to discour-
age high grade and financially strong persons from entering the auto-
mobile industry in the retail function. By having fewer, financially
stronger dealers, the manufacturer can better induce or require more
intensive dealer investment in buildings, inventories and service facili-
ties. The general appearance of a dealership has always been associ-
ated with prestige of the manufacturer. Consumer brand attachment
is easier to establish through a certain outlet "fancification." More-
over, continuous dealer investments assure the manufacturer that the
dealer will be able to render adequate service.
In addition to protecting the dealer's profitability and encouraging
investment, the restrictive franchise system serves the manufacturer in
other ways. As long as a dealer's profit basis is sufficient, he will have
little reason to handle another manufacturer's cars. His sales efforts
will be concentrated on one brand. In all likelihood, this factual ex-
clusiveness facilitates the manufacturer's efforts to gain and maintain a
relatively closed market for its parts and accessories. While the manu-
facturer in its own interest has to allow its dealers a good profit, it can
avoid its dealers' losing their aggressiveness in cultivating the market.
Dealers who do not perform satisfactorily can be eliminated by cancel-
lation or nonrenewal of their franchise agreements.
Finally, the limited and relative stable group of dealers operate in
a comparatively protected market.' 42 They can forward more accurate
estimates of future demand than dealers who are in and out of market.
The more exact these estimates, the easier is optimal long-run produc-
tion and marketing planning. This in turn assures the dealers that
they will not face distressing retail market conditions. If the planning
is incorrect, the manufacturer can expect that fluctuations in final de-
mand will be met by changes in dealer inventories rather than its rate
140. Id. at 37-44.
141. Id. at 39.
142. HEWrrT, supra note 103, at 55.
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of production. Thus, even without full forward integration, the auto-
mobile manufacturers have been able to achieve almost perfect eco-
nomic control over the distribution sector without being exposed to the
legal responsibilities and administrative burdens intrinsic to an agency
system.
The advantages for the dealers in the automobile franchise system
have almost exhaustively been enumerated in the foregoing discussion.
Even in the absence of territorial securities, the restrictive franchise
system gives each dealer a certain guarantee that under normal circum-
stances he will earn a fair profit and be able to amortize his investment.
"If he is a good man who knows his business, he . . . eventually can
average at least 25% return on his investment.114 3  The dealers can
count on a steady supply and do not have to fight for a profitable sup-
ply source. Since the nature of the dealer-manufacturer relationships
fosters mutual dependence, each dealer can expect his manufacturer to
assist him in effective merchandising. To be sure, these advantages do
not spring from the manufacturer's sheer benevolence but only reflect
the naked self-interest of the car producer. The gain of increased
business prestige "through affiliation with a large organization, fre-
quently of national extension"' 44 has to be acquired at the expense of
much of the dealer's business independence.
The alleged advantages to the public of the restrictive franchise
system are many. They include service by trained mechanics, the ov-
erall availability of repair parts, an efficient distribution system, con-
siderable ease in the disposal of the old car 4 , and financial soundness
of each dealer. This financial soundness increases the likelihood of his
remaining in business. The customer is protected from being cheated
because fraudulent practices are not conducive to maintaining the deal-
er's reputation. Furthermore, since dealers serve as a kind of price
bumper in cases of overproduction and styling errors, the public may
not be charged with the price of these manufacturing mistakes. Of
course, the question remains whether these advantages can be achieved,
or even enlarged, by alternative methods of distribution which may
prove less costly-in the broadest possible meaning-for the consumer.
Automobile Retailing and Product Differentiation
The automobile producers apparently believe that consumer brand
143. S. MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BALANCE OF POWER: THE AUTOMOBILE MAN-
UFACTURERS AND THEIR DEALERS 170 n.790 (1966) quoting Boyd, former Chrysler offi-
cial [hereinafter cited as MACAULAY]. One is tempted to wonder whether Mr. Boyd
is aware of the difference between dealer discounts and actual profits.
144. Kessler, supra note 127, at 1136.
145. M. BURY, THE AUTOMOBILE DEALER 1 (1958).
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attachment is achieved at the lowest cost through the existing distribu-
tion system. Consumer brand attachment is nothing more than prod-
uct differentiation. Each manufacturer's dealers substantially differen-
tiate the delivered product from those of competitors. This is accom-
plished by two dealer functions: personal sales promotion and special-
ized maintenance and repair service.146  Moreover, high nationwide
dealer density provides the Big Three with advantages of market cov-
erage and penetration, and the consumer views this density as provid-
ing easy access to service and repair parts regionally and nationally.
Additionally, the Big Three have developed financially strong and ef-
ficient dealers. Consequently, their dealers enjoy better locations and
attractive sales and service facilities. These, in turn, have a significant
sales promotion effect and enhance the creation of consumer attach-
ment. This cycle has led commentators to rank the use of large elabo-
rate distribution and service facilities among the most important
sources of product differentiation in the automobile industry:
By saturating an area with dealers handling their own respective
products exclusively, the three or four sellers with the best-known
brands can effectively deny their smaller existing and potential
competitors access to the best sites and most efficient retailers...
raising the per-unit sales and distribution costs of those. . . com-
petitors while entrenching still further their own "brand" names in
the minds of local consumers through the "advertising effect" of
the elaborate local dealer establishments, organizations that control
many thousands of square miles of gleaming floor space and flash-
ing neon signs. In other words, these exclusive dealerships, or, as
they are sometimes called, these "vertical-integrations-by-con-
tract," are themselves a form of "advertising," . . . thus forcing
any existing and would-be competitor to [develop] its own separate
chain of dealer outlets, establishments that will. . . be placed on
less desirable sites and manned by less experienced operators, thus
raising that competitor's per-unit costs and, by keeping its products
on the "back shelves," so to speak, lower its acceptability in the
eyes of consumers and thus the per-unit price it is able to com-
mand.147
The functioning of the distribution system contributes to the cre-
ation and maintenance of an automobile's reputation. It is a kind of
advertisement. Even if product quality is inferior, superior service may
compensate, thus preserving an already established reputation. The
more perfect the interplay between product, selling activities and ser-
vice, the higher is the probability that the product will be nonstand-
ardized in the eye of the consumer. This heightens the differentiation
146. BAm;, IusmuA. ORGANInoN, supra note 11, at 242; Lanzillotti, supra
note 73, at 330.
147. Mueller, supra note 80, at 80-81.
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gap, and price becomes less of a determining factor for customer loy-
alty.
Despite the distribution system's operation as a source of product
differentiation, it cannot be condemned without further analysis. One
commentator has warned:
The mere departure from the purely competitive model does not
alone signify that condemnation is appropriate. Lower consumer
substitutability often results from real differences among products
and from the peculiar skills or attributes of particular firms. In
these instances, the price effects of product differentiation are often
offset by the social gains resulting from the existence of product
variety.148
Business policies which promote product differentiation are often an
important form of interbrand competition. Unfortunately, in the au-
tomobile industry, "real differences among products" in the same price
range are negligible; "peculiar skills . . . of particular firms" are not
obvious. Apparently, the warning is not applicable because the price
and entry barrier effects are not offset by such social gains.
Yet, despite its contribution to product differentiation, the current
distribution system need not be eliminated. Interestingly, small com-
petitors and newcomers attempt to find "exclusive" dealers wherever
possible. They are not compelled by some lemming-like instinct to fol-
low the Big Three. Rather, great benefits can be derived by all com-
petitors from an orderly and controlled system of distribution. When
the current system emerged,' 49 it was accepted by all competitors as
superior to haphazard marketing methods. The public received a
reasonably reliable means of transportation only after there were out-
lets for replacement parts and persons trained in repair. Moreover, as
manufacturers guaranteed free repair work immediately after purchase,
this warranty had to be fulfilled by trained mechanics. The distribu-
tion of cars and parts would have proven less efficient and more costly
if the manufacturers had not concentrated these tasks in the hands of
a limited number of selected dealers. These dealers were responsible
for the maintenance of adequate service and repair facilities, including
an inventory of replacement parts.
No alternative method of automobile distribution has been at-
tempted since the emergence of the franchise system. If any other
conceivable method was less expensive for the manufacturer and
equally efficient in terms of consumer satsifaction, one of the many
148. Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor and
Its Aftermath, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1424 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Comanor].
149. See text accompanying notes 110-111 supra.
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foreign newcomers to the American car market surely would have tried
an alternative marketing method. Probably no other method would
guarantee the same product differentiation effect. However, if an al-
ternative was less costly for the entrant, he could lower his price; or if
price elasticity in the automobile market did not make price cuts worth-
while, he could offset product differentiation disadvantages arising from
his distribution method by spending more for advertising.
Seemingly, alternative methods of distribution are not considered
to be desirable by those who are disadvantaged-foreign and small
domestic manufacturers-by the present system. This is demonstrated
by their uniform adoption of the franchise system. Therefore, a
radical industry-wide reorganization of the distribution pattern should
be enforced only if the current pattern deprives the public of otherwise
obtainable benefits. Since automobile manufacturers are likely to
favor the franchise system even under the conditions of a restructured
industry, it is senseless to break up existing dealer networks and order
all car manufacturers to start over again. In addition to short-run dis-
advantages to milions of car owners, competition on the production
level would not benefit if new restrictive retail patterns emerged before
new entries occurred. Furthermore, the entry barriers created by scale
economies and capital requirements alone are high enough to scare po-
tential competitors away. 150 Because of these barriers, the additional
obstacles raised by the distribution system do not play a crucial part in
a potential entrant's consideration. In no case do these additional bar-
riers seem important enough to risk a disruption of service to the con-
sumer. New distribution devices may gradually emerge due to legal
objections against territorial restrictions or against the manufacturer's'
control over the repair parts market. This evolution could be very
beneficial. However, to attack the automobile franchise system merely
for its contribution to product differentiation would be ill-advised. A
distribution device which has no product differentiation effects, which
is adequately efficient in terms of consumer satisfaction and which is
equally accessible to and beneficial for both large and small competi-
tors in the automobile industry has yet to be invented.
In view of the foregoing, the problem of the distribution system's
contribution to product differentiation necessarily must be reformu-
lated. Without sufficient coverage of the retail and service markets,
an automobile producer is unlikely to sell the annual volume necessary
to reach minimum optimal scales of production. This underrepresented
producer will be unable financially to keep up with the Big Three in
150. See text accompanying notes 56-87 supra.
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every competitive respect. This is amply supported by fact. For ex-
ample, Kaiser's failure was due partly to a lack of a reliable dealer net-
work. Dealer organization figured prominently in the merger discus-
sions of the independents.' Also American Motors' various fortunes
in the 1950s clearly were reflected in its changing dealer strength.
15 2
Furthermore, Studebaker-Packard's rapid descent in the early Sixties
was foreshadowed by a constant loss of dealers. Finally after facing
deficits in 1958 and 1959 and very meager profits in the two follow-
ing years, 13 Chrysler emphasized the fortification of its shrinking
dealer body. This emphasis was accompanied by intensive use of the
Dealer Enterprise Plan, which was designed to assist in the establish-
ment of new retail outlets. Despite these factors and the dismal ex-
perience of producers such as Kaiser and Studebaker-Packard, small
competitors apparently still benefit from employing the franchise sys-
tem. Nevertheless, they face many difficult obstacles. The Big Three
are represented by the financially strong and experienced dealers with
first-rate facilities in strategically important locations. While a new-
comer's dealers certainly could render satisfactory service and make
fair deals, reputation and a buyer-dealership allegiance would be es-
tablished only after some time. Even then, this allegiance would be
strained because the trade-in value of a newcomer's or small competi-
tor's product is generally low.' This strain would occur irrespective
of the product's quality and competitive attributes. The buyer is influ-
enced also by "orphan car" considerations.' 5 5 Thus, any discussion of
the Big Three's product differentiation advantages resulting from their
allegedly superior distribution system seemingly reduces to two nuclei:
time and size on the production level.
Reputation, whether built up by superior quality and design or by
consumer ignorance, is the result of these nuclei. Over time, the Big
Three allegedly have absorbed the best possible dealer locations, thus
enhancing sales promotion. This process can be seen as the final stage
in the development of product differentiation advantages, which is evi-
denced by the relatively slow dealer turnover.15 6 Consequently, Big
Three dealers remain in business longer, which in turn enriches buyer
151. At the beginning of 1950, the independents had issued the following number
of franchises: Hudson, 2128; Nash, 1178; Packard, 1363; and Studebaker, 2270. ED-
WARDS, DYNAMICS, supra note 3, at 227.
152. See id. at 68-69.
153. See note 51 supra.
154. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 11, at 244; BAIN, BARRIERS,
supra note 21, at 305-6; PASHIGIAN, supra note 119, at 7-8.
155. WEISS, supra note 44, at 346.
156. See PASHIGIAN, supra note 119, at 22-24.
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confidence in the dependability of his dealer. These factors accrue
only by the passage of time. A newcomer cannot match any of these
advantages instantaneously by trying to build up its own dealer net-
work. However, serious suggestions for diluting the Big Three's time
advantage are not conceivable. Placing the Big Three on equal footing
with newcomers or small competitors by ordering the termination of
all existing dealerships or abandonment of facilities in strategic loca-
tions, is unrealistic. 57 Even though such action would dilute some of
the Big Three's time advantage, their size advantage cannot be matched
by any competitor. The huge output of cars necessary to nourish a
dense dealer network is unobtainable.
If bigness is indeed the main source of product differentiation ad-
vantages, the source-not the symptoms-should be attacked. Even
if the distribution system has contributed to the Big Three's size and
market power to some degree,' 58 this is not yet a sufficient basis for
restructuring it. If the conduct of the existing manufacturers does not
contribute unnecessarily to a natural entry-forestalling effect which is
attributable to the indispensable existence of dealer networks, a basis
for an attack against distribution-caused product differentiation would
be difficult to find. Rather, the product differentiation effects of the
distribution system must be formulated in a different light. This re-
quires consideration of whether the practices found in managing auto-
mobile distribution artificially increase the product differentiation entry
barriers which already exist because of reputation, conspicuous con-
sumption motives and sales promotion. Artificially means a contribu-
tion not attributable solely to the size-output volume-of the Big
Three and time. Such an analysis must determine whether and to what
degree the Big Three have prevented their competitors access to their
dealers' experience and financial capacity 59 and whether the Big Three
have endowed their dealers with undue market power on the retail level
thereby substantially reducing intrabrand competition. 60
Dealer Efficiency Regulation, the Location
Clause and Section 1 of the Sherman Act
Since 1951, the number of American passenger car retailers has
157. The suggestion would destroy only dealer allegiance. Product attachment
would still create a superior starting position for every new Big Three dealer.
158. See BAiN, BARRmRs, supra note 21, at 302.
159. See id. at 301; Mueller, supra note 80, at 90.
160. Another issue is whether the manufacturers have forced their dealers to pur-
chase parts and accessories exclusively from the respective manufacturers. However,
this issue is beyond the scope of this article and will not be discussed.
April 19731 THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
steadily declined.'' Over the same period new car registration has in-
creased from 6,326,43812 to 8,263,436.163 The interrelation between
these factors is expressed by a near doubling of the number of automo-
biles sold per outlet.' This loss of dealerships is not the result of
termination for insufficient representation. The principal reason for
termination is death of the dealership's owner.' 65 While this explains
dealer turnover, it does not explain the failure to substitute successors
in the same or an adjacent location. One possible explanation for the
shrinking number of dealerships could be a tendency towards inter-
corporate dualing. Intercorporate dealerships are franchised by at
least two domestic manufacturers. However, the number of intercor-
porate dealerships declined at approximately the same rate as the num-
161. The number of retail outlets since 1951 is as follows:
Source: AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Jan. 31, 1972, at 1 and July 31, 1972, at 1
Date No. of Date No. of
(Jan. 1) retail outlets (Jan. 1) retail outlets
1951 47,543 1962 31,331
1952 46,014 1963 30,853
1953 45,191 1964 30,827
1954 41,910 1965 30,691
1955 40,374 1966 30,278
1956 41,018 1967 28,422
1957 37,982 1968 27,784
1958 37,188 1969 27,486
1959 35,077 1970 27,071
1960 33,658 1971 26,126
1961 32,482 1972 25,126
1972 25,621
July 1, 1972 25,530
162. 1970 AUTOMOTIVE NEWS ALMANAC 29.
163. AUTOMOTIVE NEWS Feb. 21, 1972, at 29.
164. New car sales per outlet since 1955 are as follows:
Source: AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Feb. 28, 1972, at 1.
All U.S.
Year Americ. Mot. Chrysler Ford G.M. Studeb. Industry
1955 49 129 225 215 47 175
1957 56 130 194 169 30 154
1959 127 97 199 169 53 158
1961 125 104 208 193 34 172
1963 139 163 243 283 33 233
1965 115 213 318 351 8 299
1967 100 212 258 321 270
1969 104 233 332 351 307
1971 114 240 343 361 320
165. From 1965 to June 1969, 975 General Motors' dealers were terminated: 831
because of death, 32 for inadequate sales performance, 15 for failure to provide ade-
quate service, 13 for insolvency or bankruptcy, 38 because the dealer ceased business
operations, and 46 for various other reasons. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Ur-
ban and Rural Economic Development of the Select Senate Comm. on Small Business:
The Impact of Franchising on Small Business, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., Part 2, at 817
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Hearings, Small Business Franchising]. For Chrysler's ex-
perience, see id. at 860.
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ber of dealerships.16 Therefore, the foregoing would indicate a trend
towards fewer and larger dealerships.167
This trend towards larger dealerships could be manifested in a
growing number of intracorporate retailers.1 68  The gap left by a
terminated dealer is filled by one of the manufacturer's established
dealerships in the same vicinity. In the past, this dealer handled a
different line for the same manufacturer. Thus, an intracorporate
dealership is created. The members of the Big Three 69 increasingly
have created these dealerships over the last four years. 170  Seemingly,
this is not explained only by recession periods in general or strike situ-
ations encountered by a single manufacturer. Remarkably, the in-
crease of General Motors' intracorporate multiples was slighter during
the strike year of 1970 than in 1969 and 1971. Although this three
year trend will not necessarily continue, it certainly casts doubt on
Pashigian's observation that "dual dealerships have been discouraged
as long-run policy. 1 71 Not a single line is distributed solely by intra-
corporate exclusive dealerships. 72  It is, therefore, questionable "to
consider the use of multi-line dealers as a short-run device for cush-
ioning the effects of a sales decline.
'1 73
If the number of franchises granted by the Big Three had re-
mained constant, the dealership decline could be explained fully by in-
tracorporate dualing. However, the decline in franchises granted over
166. Intercorporate duals declined as follows:
Percentage of
Year (Jan. 1) Dealerships Intercorporates Intercorp.
1969 27,486 655 2.38
1970 27,071 725 2.67
1971 26,126 755 2.88
1972 25,621 680 2.65
July 1 1972 25,530 670 2.62
These data were computed from the following sources: AuToMoTrVE NEws, Jan. 31,
1972, at 81; 1970 AUTOMOTIVE NEWS ALMANAC 72.
167. AtrroMoTIvE NEWS, Jan. 31, 1972, at 81.
168. An intracorporate retailer is a dealer who retails at least two brands of one
manufacturer.
169. American Motors sells only one brand.
170. The annual percentages of intracorporate dealerships are as follows:
Company 1969 1970 1971 1972
Chrysler 58.4% 59.5% 61.4% 62.8%
Ford 35.3% 37.1% 38.7% 40.5%
G.M. 38.2% 39.1% 39.3% 40.0%
These data were compiled from the following sources: AuToMonvE NEWS, Jan. 31,
1972, at 81; 1970 AUTOMOTIVE NEWS ALMANAC 72.
171. PASHIGIAN, supra note 119, at 117.
172. An "intracorporate exclusive dealer" is a dealer who is not dualed in either an
intercorporate or intracorporate sense.
173. Id. at 123.
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the last four years'74 is less sharp than the decline in dealerships.
175
Therefore, neither the loss of dealerships nor the considerable increase
of cars sold per outlet is fully explained by intercorporate or intracor-
porate dualing.
Dealer Efficiency Regulation
Two other interlinked factors share in these developments. Popu-
lation has shifted noticeably from rural to urban areas. Accordingly,
the basis for a sufficint sales volume of a dealership in a rural area
declines thereby endangering the profitability of all dealerships within
the area through overrepresentation of the brand. In these cases, the
manufacturer simply will not substitute new dealers for those who quit
or are terminated.
The second factor is that the average dealership is still far from
achieving a minimum optimal scale. In Pashigian's extensive study
of the relationship between dealership size and profitability,' 7 he as-
certained that the per unit costs of dealerships rise noticeably if sales
decline below 600 units annually. 177  "However, [the data] suggest
that further economies appear to be modest once a firm has reached
the asset size of about $500,000 which would be equivalent to a new
car volume of about 600 new units annually. Further economies may
be experienced as the size of firm increases, but they do not appear to
be significant.' 7 8  Pashigian estimated that according to two different
per unit cost indices, the costs per unit for retail sales of 300 units an-
nually were 115 or 130 percent of the standard costs for 600 or 800
units respectively.' 79 If the price-demand elasticity for new cars was
negligible and all dealers in all market segments encountered the same
diseconomies of scale, manufacturers would not have to be concerned
174. Total franchises granted by the Big Three:
Company 1969 1970 1971 1972
Chrysler 12,247 12,100 10,177 10,065
Ford 9,787 9,849 9,781 9,864
G.M. 17,870 17,740 17,410 17,400
Total 39,904 39,689 37,368 37,329
Totals adjusted
for Imperial
franchises 38,440 38,219 37,368 37,329
The 1971 decline of Chrysler dealers was in large part due to the expiration of 1470
Imperial franchies. These data were compiled from the following sources: AuroMo-
TIVE NEWS., Jan. 31, 1972, at 81; 1970 AUTOMOTIVE NEWS ALMANAC 72.
175. Compare note 174 supra with note 161 supra.
176. See PASHIGIAN, supra note 119, at 196-216.
177. Id. at 223. But see WHITE, supra note 3, at 49 (in rural areas, the minimum
efficient scale may be considerably lower than 600 units per year).
178. PASHIGIAN, supra note 119, at 210.
179. Id. at 223.
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with scale economies at the retail level. However, a weak price-de-
mand elasticity does exist. Since increased retail costs result in in-
creased retail prices, overall sales volume expansion is impeded.
Moreover, actual differences in dealer costs hamper the manufacturer
in interbrand competition.
Each member of the Big Three reacts identically to shifting popu-
lations and retail scale economies. They attempt to strengthen their
dealers by increasing the number of intracorporate duals and by meticu-
lously determining the sales capacity in each market segment. The
continuous analysis of detailed dealer sales reports and concomitant
adjustments to market surveys lead to the development of certain sales
objectives for each dealership. However, these analyses and adjust-
ments also lead to dealer efficiency regulation based on the number of
dealers which an area can bear while maintaining profitability.
180
This substitutes regulation by manufacturers for that which would
result through the market itself. Such a result is most objectionable
in rural areas where dealers are assigned large areas of primary re-
sponsibility.' 81 Where the number of outlets is limited in the first
place, any further limitation restricts intrabrand competition among
the dealers of each company. Additionally, vigorous sales efforts in
interbrand competition are reduced to nonprice competition, bringing
the oligopolistic effect to the retail level. Seemingly, this is at odds
with the manufacturers' basic aim of inducing their dealers to engage
in fervent interbrand competition.
However, especially in sparsely propulated rural areas, the decline
of interbrand competition may well be for the manufacturers the lesser
of two evils. A lack of sales volume and the resulting profitability loss
might necessitate intercorporate dualing. Such a dealer reaction usu-
ally is watched with suspicious eyes by the sovereigns in Detroit. The
intercorporate dealer may be deflected from devoting his full efforts
to his primary manufacturer. Accordingly, when market surveys deem
it necessary, terminated dealers are not replaced so that problems asso-
ciated with a superabundance of dealerships are avoided. Intracor-
porate dualing is encouraged to provide each dealer with a sufficient
sales potential.
Both the small manufacturer and the public are victims of this de-
velopment in rural areas. The Big Three are not required to support
American Motors or any small foreign competitor. However, dealer
efficiency regulation shelters Big Three dealers from the economic ne-
180. See Restricted Channels, supra note 138, at 803 & n.35.
181. See text accompanying notes 234-47 infra.
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cesity of acquiring another manufacturer's franchise. This tends to
enlarge the operation requirements for dealerships of the independents,
making market penetration by small competitors and potential new-
comers more difficult especially in sparsely populated areas. While
a thirty percent decline in the number of General Motors dealerships
would not affect its market penetration seriously, a small manufacturer
lacking the opportunity for intracorporate dualing would suffer con-
siderably from a similar loss of its dealer body.18 2  In addition to its
deleterious impact on market penetration by small competitors, dealers
efficiency regulation affects the public adversely. This effect some-
times is expressed as a local service monopoly. However, there is
more to it.
The Navajo Story
The several facets of public interest involved in efficiency regula-
tion are illustrated by the Navajo Indians' attempts to obtain a Gen-
eral Motors dealership.' 8 3  The Navajo reservation in Arizona covers
an area of 24,000 square miles. This is approximately five times larger
than the State of Connecticut. Yet no sales outlet or authorized ser-
vice garage of any automobile manufactuer exists within this territory.
The communities located near the boundaries of the reservation are
served by dealerships and service garages available at distances from
30 to 75 miles. However residents of the central part of the reserva-
tion must travel from 70 to 190 miles. About 2,000 motor vehicles,
mostly pickup trucks, are owned by the reservation's 125,000 inhabi-
tants.184 Car owners from Chinle, roughly in the center of the reser-
vation, must traverse the following distances for service: 100 miles to
Gallup, New Mexico, 120 miles to Holbrook, Arizona, 150 miles to
182. From January 1, 1960 to January 1, 1972, General Motors dealerships dropped
from 14,845 to 12,125 (18.3 percent); American Motors dealer body shrunk from 2,977
to 2,025 (32 percent). See 1970 AUTOMOTIVE NEWS ALMANAC 7; AUTOMOTIVE
NEWS, Jan. 31, 1972, at 81. Over the same period, General Motors dealers increased
their sales from 169 to 361 units per outlet; American Motors dealers' sales declined
from 127 to 114 units per outlet. See AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Feb. 28, 1972, at 1. See
also note 164 supra.
183. The background for this section is correspondence between Professor Lawrence
A. Sullivan, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, and Robert Hilgen-
dorf. Further material was supplied in interviews with Robert Hilgendorf at Chinle,
Arizona, Mar. 28 & 29, 1972.
184. These motor vehicles are indispensable to the inhabitants of the reservation.
For example, wood or household fuel must be transported many miles by families.
Few families have wells for water. Water must be hauled a minimum of several miles
for domestic use. Travel to stores for food and other necessaries often involves dis-
tances of 100 miles.
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Winslow, Arizona, and Farmington, New Mexico, and 200 miles to
Flagstaff, Arizona. Each of the first four communities has only one
dealership for each of the Big Three. Trained mechanics do not exist
on the Navojo reservation. Thus, each dealership entertains a service
monopoly to some extent. Even assuming that these monopolies are
not exploited in the form of inferior work and unreasonable service
charges, the enormous distances between Navojo communities and the
service garages burden all reservation car owners. Moreover, customer
choices in new car purchases are limited. Intrabrand competition vir-
tually does not exist. A buyer's shopping around is limited to a com-
parison of offers made by the Big Three dealers in one of the dealer-
ship communities unless the customer undertakes the task of commut-
ing between Flagstaff, Winslow (58 miles) Holbrook (another 34
miles), Gallup (another 89 miles), and Farmington (another 119
miles). Also, the existence of only three car dealers in a location rep-
resenting a segregable geographical market is most conducive to the es-
tablishment of price floors which negate the buyer's shopping advan-
tages. This can occur in the absence of any collusion. Finally, the
absence of dealerships within a radius of 100 miles has the practical
effect of weakening warranty coverage for Navajo customers.
In order to rectify this situation, several members from the Chinle
community formed the Tsegi Motor Company and tried to obtain a
General Motors franchise.185 The dealership was to be a community
venture and run on a nonprofit basis. The land and all labor necessary
to build the facilities were to be donated. This proposal met General
Motors' objections. Under its Motors Holding Plan," 6 a twenty-five
percent self-investment is required. This investment could not be pro-
vided by any single member or group in the community. Moreover,
General Motors rejected nonprofit operation because it deprived the op-
erators of a profit maximizing incentive and would endanger the project
in periods when losses would occur. This, of course was accompanied
by the unspoken fear that General Motors' investment in the dealer-
ship might not be recoverable. When the Navjos suggested that they
could obtain sufficient funds, the manufacturers raised objections based
on dealer efficiency considerations:
[D]ealership locations for any community or metropolitan area
185. After one year of being shuffled from one General Motors official to another,
Tsegi's legal representative gave up. However, the matter is currently being pursued,
even though it is far from final agreement.
186. Under its Motor Holding Franchise Investment Plan, the General Motors-
owned Motor Holding Division loans up to seventy-five percent of the capital required
for new General Motors' dealers.
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[are selected] with certain fundamental objectives in mind. Ex-
amples would be, an attempt to place the dealer in a position to
render convenient service to owners and prospective customers
within the area and help assure a reasonable profit potential for
the dealership over the business cycle. Many factors are consid-
ered, such as population and population trends, historical and an-
ticipated sales, availability of land and facilities, economic condi-
tions in the local vicinity and, importantly, present dealership rep-
resentation as well as an analysis of car registrations over a period
of time.
Survey teams employed by each Division continually review
and collect statistical and economic information in connection with
each metropolitan area. Each existing or potential dealership is
studied carefully. This means that as areas experience shifts in
population and varying degrees of growth, and as highways and
population patterns shift, corresponding changes in number and lo-
cation of dealerships eventually occur.18
7
This summary represents objective prerequisites which must be met be-
fore any of the Big Three grants a new franchise. In addition, subjec-
tive considerations-sometimes called the "three Cs," cash, character
and capacity-are included.
Even though General Motors ascertained that the Chinle area con-
ceivably could sustain and support a small Chevrolet dealership,' 88 the
franchise application was rejected. This rejection was based on effi-
ciency regulation considerations including "the equities of all current
existing dealers . . . as well as the equities of the total Navojo peo-
ple."' 8' 9 Tsegi Motors was advised by the Chevrolet zone manager
that the Chinle area lies within the area of primary responsibility of
Gallup and Holbrook. These two General Motors dealers claimed
that the loss of the reservation sales potential would prove fatal to their
economic existence. Presently, these two dealerships are still very
much alive, and the Navjo people are still waiting for convenient ser-
vice.
190
This description is not to deny that entry barriers due to scale
economies exist on the distribution level. However, the Chinle dealer-
ship was viable. The question of whether its existence would be more
valuable for the public than the survival of the Gallup and Holbrook
187. Letter from R. B. Harris, Dealer Development General Motors Marketing
Staff, to Robert Hilgendorf, Aug. 27, 1970.
188. On the basis of a market survey, twenty new cars and sixty-eight pickup trucks
could be expected to be sold annually. This is about fifteen vehicles above the min-
imum requirement for the profitability of a dealership.
189. Letter from G. M. Molloy, Manager, Dealer Development, to Robert Hilgen-
dorf, Nov. 17, 1970.
190. Neither Ford nor Chrysler have been approached by Tsegi Motors or other
similar Navajo corporations.
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dealerships will not be answered. Yet if the survival of these two
dealers really depended on the additional forty-four cars sold annually
by each to Navajo customers, General Motors could use its superior
capital position and temporarily loan funds to these dealers thereby
tiding them over incidental losses due to the new competition.1 91 If
the Gallup and Holbrook dealers' bleak financial outlook resulted from
the potential loss of service and parts business, it could be concluded
that the local service monopoly has been exploited up to now. Gen-
eral Motors' rejection of Tsegi's application invites speculation that
it did not expect to gain any greater market penetration. This specu-
lation arises for two reasons. First, most of the Navajo people are
attached to General Motors cars and pickups anyway. Secondly,
any possible gain would be outweighed by competitive disadvantages
suffered by the Gallup and Holbrook dealers. Ford and Chrysler
dealers might develop a superior profitability basis due to their higher
sales volume.
Dealer Efficiency Regulation and Sherman Section 1
The experience of Tsegi Motors illustrates the effects of dealer
efficiency regulation on the consumer. The legal analysis of this ex-
perience demonstrates the antitrust aspects of the current automobile
distribution system. Undoubtedly, a system of selective franchising and
its concomitant efficiency regulation restrains trade. Not everybody
can deal with new General Motors cars; these cars are available to the
public only through a limited number of outlets. Moreover, warranty
coverage requires that service be performed by authorized service gar-
ages; these service facilities are limited. Finally, although independent
service garages exist, the dealers' garages enjoy a decided advantage in
mechanical training and parts inventories. These advantages result
from membership in the franchised dealer body. Again, General Mo-
tors has deliberately channeled, and thereby limited, the availability
of repair parts and qualified service. However, restraints of trade are
intrinsic in every contract. Section 1 of the Sherman Act in its judicial
interpretation 92 only outlaws unreasonable restraints of trade.
Combination
The question of reasonableness is not reached unless a "contract,
combination, or conspiracy" in restraint of trade is found.9 3  Both the
191. See, e.g., PASHiGiAN, supra note 119, at 40 n.20.
192. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
193. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
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refusal to grant a new franchise and the termination or nonrenewal of
an existing franchise constitute refusals to deal. Notwithstanding non-
economic motives, every refusal to deal is a means of achieving or
maintaining some degree of vertical control "such as [resale pirce
stability], customer restrictions, or manufacturer or dealer exclu-
sives."' 194 The traditional approach to refusals to deal was announced
in Colgate. 9
Since that decision, unilateral decisions of a manufacturer not to do
business with a former or would-be dealer are not subject to the anti-
trust law. 9 While Colgate was decided in the setting of resale price
maintenance, its broad language is regarded as equally applicable to
other restraints as well.
During the last fifty years Colgate has been distinguished and
limited.' 97 Only cases of Doric simplicity have a chance to pass
through the narrow channel which the courts have left to the manu-
facturers.98  However, even though Colgate apparently is "on the criti-
cally ailing list,"' 99 cases of Doric simplicity are not as "rare in this day
of complex business enterprise" 20° as Judge Moore assumed. As long
as real cooperation between members of a dealer network and a manu-
facturer in detecting nonconforming dealers cannot be shown, the
194. Buxbaum, Boycotts and Restrictive Marketing Arrangements, 64 MICH. L. REV.
671, 676 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Buxbaum].
195. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). Without entering into
formal agreements, Colgate had made clear to the wholesalers and retailers of its prod-
ucts that it would feel free to stop doing business with them if they did not adhere to
Colgate's pricing policy. This practice was upheld. "In the absence of any purpose
to create or maintain a monopoly, the act does not restrict the long recognized right
of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his
own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal. And, of course, he
may announce in advance the circumstances under which he will refuse to sell." Id. at
307.
196. The presence of monopoly power may deprive the trader of his freedom to
unilaterally refuse to deal with another. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo
Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
197. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); United
States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); United States v. Bausch & Lomb
Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Beech-Nut Packing
Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922); United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
198. George W. Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 787, 790
2d Cir. 1960). See also Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 150 n.6 (1968);
Ford Motor Co. v. Webster's Auto Sales Inc., 361 F.2d 874, 880-81 (1st Cir. 1966);
Carbon Steel Products Corp. v. Alan Wood Steel Co., 289 F. Supp. 584, 588 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
199. Halper, Individual Refusals to Deal: Customer Selection or Dealer Protection,
22 ABA ANTITRUST 49, 50 (1963).
200. George W. Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 787, 790
(2d Cir. 1960).
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manufacturer's refusal to deal with the nonconforming dealer is not
classified as a boycott but as a unilateral business decision. 20 1  The
courts have not been impressed by the argument that when all mem-
bers of a distribution network are informed about their supplier's mar-
keting policy, they adhere to it because they rely on compliance by all
dealers and, therefore, the manufacturer is expected to remedy the situ-
ation instantaneously when one distributor "breaks out." The Inter-
state Circuit doctrine 2°2 is not invoked by the mere existence of a mu-
tual understanding concerning the distribution policy to be observed.
The fact that the manufacturer unilaterally announces and induces dis-
tribution policies apparently has been given more weight than the "in-
vitation to a plan" language of Interstate Circuit. In two cases involv-
ing automobile distribution quarrels, 2°3 the allegation that an existing
dealer had induced the manufacturer to cease dealing with another re-
tailer was held insufficient to show conspiracy: "[A] manufacturer
would not decide to reduce the number of its dealers in a particular
city. . . without discussing the matter with. . . the. . . dealer whom
it wished to retain."2 4 Seemingly, the notion behind these decisions is
that a manufacturer must be free under the antitrust laws to replace an
existing dealer with a new one regardless of the hardship for the for-
mer dealer.20 5 If a marketing practice seems illegal when viewed in
the context of the entire market, other antitrust statutes supposedly will
provide a basis for condemning the refusal to deal. Where marketing
practices do not seem illegal in their market context, however, "boycott
201. Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 323 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1963); House
of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1962).
202. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939). The Court held
than an invitation to conduct followed by the adoption of the invited conduct constituted
a conspiracy for Sherman Act section 1 purposes. Id. at 227.
203. Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 822 (1957); Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 239
F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956), aff'g per curiam 138 F. Supp. 899 (D. Md. 1956), cert. de-
nied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957).
204. Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899, 906 (D. Md.
1956).
205. See Fulda, Individual Refusals to Deal: When Does Single-Firm Conduct Be-
come Vertical Restraint?, 30 L. & CoNTEmP. PROB. 590, 597 (1965). Usually courts
have held that every nonmonopolistic manufacturer has the right to select dealers who
will devote their time and energies to selling its products. No manufacturer should be
forced to continue entrusting the marketing of its products to dealers with divided loy-
alties adverse to its interest. E.g., McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269
F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1959); Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954); Deltown Foods, Inc. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 219
F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); United States v. J. I. Case Co., 101 F. Supp. 856, 864
(D. Minn. 1951); accord, McKessor & Robbins, Inc. v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 235 F.
Supp. 743, 749 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
April 1973] THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
concepts should not be used to bootstrap the practice into illegality"20 6
in the first place.
The fact that such marketing practices were not assailable under
section 1 of the Sherman Act as long as they were unilaterally im-
posed and enforced did not find applause from all judges. In order to
overcome a seeming weakness in section 3 of the Clayton Act,20 7 Judge
MacMahon led a bold attack in Albert H. Cayne Equipment Corp. v.
Union Asbestos & Rubber Co.2"" He reasoned that "refusals to con-
tinue to deal unless the buyer join with the seller in a contract violative
of the antitrust law are clearly illegal."2"9  In his opinion, the applica-
tion of Sherman section 1 did not require the existence of an outright
conspiracy or any boycott element. The manufacturer's invitation "to
enter into a bi-lateral contract on condition that the offeree bow to
terms claimed to be illegal under the antitrust laws"21 0 was considered
sufficient for section 1 purposes."' If this opinion were endorsed
on the highest judicial level, one unsound result of the Sherman Act
would be overcome.2 1 2 A dealer who refuses to enter a contract viola-
tive of the antitrust laws, and who suffers the termination of his fran-
chise as a consequence of his refusal, would receive a treble damage
award as a reward for his ability to resist under the Cayne doctrine.
However, to equate an invitation to a contract-the incipiency of
any agreement-with a full-blown agreement strains the wording of
section 1 of the Sherman Act beyond the limits set by Congress. This
would be indefensible. 211 Moreover, the Cayne doctrine would not
apply to cases wherein a manufacturer resorted to an unconditioned
206. Buxbaum, supra note 194, at 690.
207. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970). This section covers contracts, not refusals to con-
tract.
208. 220 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
209. id. at 787.
210. Id. at 786-87.
211. See Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 993 (1964); Osbom v. Sinclair Refining Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 963 (1961).
212. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 162 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing): "Obviously, it makes no sense to deny recovery to a pressured retailer who re-
sists temptation to the last and grant it to one who momentarily yields but is restored
to virtue by the vision of treble damages. It is not the momentary acquiescence but
the punhsiment for refusing to acquiesce that does the damage on which recovery is
based."
213. Judge MacMahon's view is not supported by the invitation to a plan language
of Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939) (invitation tacitly
accepted). His double incipiency doctrine is equally as questionable. The market
foreclosure required by section 3 of the Clayton Act is generated by the implemen-
tation of an agreement, not the invitation to an agreement.
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nonrenewal or termination of a contract. Also, the doctrine would
not apply when a manufacturer would not even seriously consider sup-
plying a dealer-applicant in order to maintain its entrenched system of
reliable outlets. Thus, the doctrine would not bring relief to the Na-
vajo people or applicants'in a similar position, unless the whole fran-
chise distribution system of the automobile industry was regarded as an
unlawful marketing practice.
A Departure from the Traditional Analysis
Assuming that the automobile manufacturers make their market-
ing decisions in cases such as the Navajo application independent of
any communication with existing dealers, such actions would be uni-
lateral refusals to deal. Strictly unilateral refusals in a nonmonopolis-
tic context seemingly are not vulnerable under the traditional interpre-
tations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. However, three relatively
recent Supreme Court decisions2 14 support the contention that the rela-
tionship between a manufacturer and its dealer network constitutes a
combination for antitrust law purposes.2148 To be sure, neither Simpson
nor Schwinn, at first glance, touch the problems which determine the
scope of Colgate, since neither dealt with restrictions which were uni-
laterally imposed by suppliers. The restrictions in Simpson and Schwinn
were parts of the contracts between supplier and retailer. Under the
anti-trust laws it matters not whether such restrictions were thrust upon
the dealer by his supplier or whether they were negotiated with mutual
consent. They remain bilateral restrictions. Consequently, it makes no
difference whether the manufacturer enforces the observance of these
contractual restrictions unilaterally or in co-operation with other dealers.
Therefore only Herald directly affects Colgate.
The new approach of the three decisions is found elsewhere. The
Supreme Court evaluated the restrictions in the context of the restrictive
distribution systems in their entirety. The mere fact that standard
contracts were signed by the company and dealer in each case, thereby
endowing the retail level with complete uniformity in its obligations
and rights, provided an element of concert which was viewed as respon-
sible for the particular market impact of the restrictions. In a similar
way this basic element of concert is also present whenever members of
a dealer network are forced, by fear of refusal to deal, to follow the
214. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
214a. The following analysis draws upon and elaborates concepts developed in the
course of an analysis of territorial practices in the automobile industry done by Pro-
fessor Lawrence A. Sullivan for the National Housing and Economic Development
Law Project, University of California School of Law, Berkeley.
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unilaterally announced marketing policy of their supplier. This basic
element of concert, of course, does not cease to exist when a single
dealer passively acquiesces or unsuccessfully tries to resist the particular
anticompetitive policy upon which the manufacturer unilaterally decided.
The first of these three cases was Simpson v. Union Oil Co. 215 A
gasoline station operator had taken a one year lease from Union Oil on
condition that he sell its product on consignment at prices set by the
company. After he cut the retail price for gas, Union refused to re-
new the lease. The Court found this arrangement illegal. Speaking
for the majority, Justice Douglas failed to give clear criteria for the de-
markation between agency and sales relationships. However, he did
emphasize the use of such contracts in a "vast gasoline distribution
system." Even though the case dealt with resale price maintenance,
its pragmatic approach is applicable to every systematic restraint of
trade in light of the function of the antitrust laws as a- check on private
economic power:
When however, a "consignment" device is used to cover a vast
gasoline distribution system, fixing prices through many retail out-
lets, the antitrust laws prevent calling the "consignment" an
agency, for then the end result of United States v. Socony - Vac-
uum Oil Co. . . . would be avoided merely by clever manipulation
of words, not by differences in substance. The present, coercive"consignment" device, if successful against challenge under the an-
titrust laws, furnishes a wooden formula for administering prices
on a vast scale. 2
16
When applied to refusals to deal in order to avoid explicit vertical re-
strictions, this approach would stress the impact of the manufacturer's
refusal to deal when an elaborate retailer network exists rather than the
distinction between bilateral and unilateral conduct.
The second of the cases which viewed the dealer network as
a combination was decided three years after Simpson. In United States
v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,217 the Court held per se unlawful certain
territorial and customer restrictions imposed by Schwinn on its twenty-
two franchised distributors. Over ten years, its share of the bicycle
market had declined nearly ten percent. In order to regain the lost
ground, Schwinn distributed its products by sale to wholesalers who
resold to a large number of franchised retailers and by direct sale to
franchised retailers with a payment of commissions to the wholesaler
215. 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
216. Id. at 21-22. Referring to Kor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S.
207, 213 (1959), Justice Douglas further remarked that "it matters not that the com-
plainant may be only one merchant." 377 U.S. at 16 (emphasis added).
217. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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placing the order on the retailer's behalf. Both wholesalers and re-
tailers were free to deal with other brands of bicycles. However,
wholesalers were not allowed to sell to retailers outside of exclusive
territories; retailers were not alowed to sell to other unfranchised re-
tailers. Both types of restrictions were considered to be "restraints
upon alienation which are beyond the power of the manufacturer to
impose upon its vendees and which, since the nature of the transaction
includes an agreement, combination or understanding, are violations
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.1218  More importantly, the Court
emphasized that restraints as to territory or customers, vertical or hori-
zontal, are unlawful if they are ancillary to price-fixing and an "integral
part of the whole distribution system. '12 19  As in Simpson, refusals to
deal made in order to maintain a well balanced restrictive marketing
system cannot go unaffected by this language.
The last Supreme Court decision to view a distribution system as
a combination in the meaning of section 1 of the Sherman Act was
Albrecht v. Herald Co. 220  There were two different combinations in-
volved. Justice White based his opinion on a combination between the
defendant newspaper publisher and two third parties who solicited sub-
scribers for defendant's newspaper and temporarily served as a distributor
on one newspaper home delivery route. The employment of these two
parties was aimed at forcing one of defendant's distributors not to ov-
ercharge his customers and abide by the maximum resale price set by
defendant. This price had been set in order to counterbalance the ter-
ritorial exclusivity of the newspaper's distributors. While the decision
is controversial in its treatment of the interplay between maximum
price maintenance and territorial restrictions, the case is particularly
important for its erosion of the traditional notions of conspiracy. 22°a
Still more important for the analysis developed in this article is the
218. Id. at 377-78.
219. Id. at 375, quoting United States v. Bausch & Lomb Co., 321 U.S. 707, 720
(1944). The Schwinn decision was foreshadowed by the dissent in White Motor Co.
v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963): "The motivations of White Motor and its dis-
tributors and dealers are inextricably intertwined; the distributors and dealers are each
acquainted with the contracts and have readily complied . . . without which the
contracts would be of no effect. It is hard for me to draw a distinction on the basis
of who initiates such a plan. Indeed, under Interstate Circuit . . . the unanimity of ac-
tion by some 300 parties here forms the basis of an 'understanding that all were to join,'
and the economies of the situation would certainly require as much." Id. at 280
(Clark, J., dissenting).
220. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
220a. With respect to the members of the combinations being attacked, compare
Albrecht v. Herald Co., id., with United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29
(1960).
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Court's obvious and plain reference to the existing scheme of price
fixing: "The combination with retailers arose because their acquiescence
in the suggested prices was secured by threats of termination ... 21
The combination enjoined was not the distribution as such. However,
the Court's opinion supports the view that unilateralism and combina-
tion are not necessarily antagonistic.
The refusal to deal with the Navajos was, of course, of a different
sort than Herald dealt with. It was not that a rebelling dealer was to
be brought into line by threats of exclusion from the dealer network,
but rather that the balance of the distribution system was to be main-
tained by keeping the number of dealers constant. The Navajo case
therefore resembles the sole outlet decisions,221a except that General
Motors' decision was supposedly not dependent upon any communica-
tion with affected dealers. However, the new combination approach of
the Supreme Court is equally applicable here. It bridges the gap be-
tween bilateral and unilateral sole outlet decisions, as it does between
unilaterally announced and bilaterally negotiated marketing policies.
None of the cases outlined above dealt explicitly with how far a
manufacturer can go in enforcing its marketing policy. In the area of a
single sales relationship absent an elaborate distribution pattern or system,
Colgate may still be alive.22 2 This bow of reverence before the ancient
Colgate doctrine, however, cannot deter the use of the Supreme Court's
language for the combination element in the context of the automobile
distribution system. Although combination and conspiracy are not
synonymous, they have equal rights in the interpretation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act. The analysis arising from a reading of Simpson,
Schwinn and Albrecht lays Colgate to rest. The unilateralism test is
replaced by a test which allows a much better differentiation in evalu-
ating the competitive impact of all types of refusals to deal. The elab-
orate distribution system is the basis for finding the requisite combina-
tion. This combination inherently restrains trade.223  Then, the manu-
facturer's decisions-unilateral or bilateral-affect this restraint; they
animate it; they mitigate or strengthen it each time anew. The na-
ture and effect of the restraint thus accomplished can only be ascer-
tained and evaluated as to its reasonableness in the context of the entire
structure of the production and retail levels of the automobile industry.
One possible objection to this procedure is that the combination
221. Id. at 149.
221a. See note 263 infra.
222. See cases cited in note 201 supra.
223. See text accompanying notes 191-92 supra.
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analysis is based on cases in which the particular anticompetitive policy
would be a per se violation if concertedly adopted. Simpson and Al-
brecht involved resale price maintenance.2 24 In dealing with territorial
resale restrictions, Schwinn held such restrictions illegal per se for the
first time. 25  Except possibly for the location clause,22 6 none of the
automobile manufacturers' distribution practices fit into these two or
any of the other per se categories. The practices do not have the "per-
nicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue" that
justifies the conclusive presumption of their unreasonableness and
therefore renders them "illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the pre-
cise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.
227
However, the logic of the combination analysis does not demand its
restriction to per se violations. Any other restraint of trade arising
from the management of a distribution system is susceptible to a test of
its reasonableness.
Reasonableness
The reasonableness of a combination is not subject to any rule
of thumb:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.
To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the
facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of
the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the par-
ticular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an
otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to
predict consequences.
2 2 8
Either the purpose of the combination or its effect must unreasonably
restrain competition. When this rule of reason test is applied to re-
224. Resale price maintenance was first outlawed in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John
D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
225. But see Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958), citing
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S.
211 (1899), for the proposition that allocation of markets is illegal per se.
226. See text accompanying notes 250-66 infra.
227. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
228. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). After
Schwinn, the following can be added; "But the antitrust outcome does not turn merely
on the presence of sound business reason or motive .... Our inquiry is whether
... the effect on competition in the market place is substantially adverse." United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 375 (1967).
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fusals to deal on the basis of efficiency regulation, they must be held
illegal as an unreasonable restraint of trade, at least in all those non-
metropolitan areas where competition from small companies is negligi-
ble or non-existent.
The purpose of dealer efficiency regulation is to maintain profita-
bility.2 29  The maintenance of profitability encourages dealer invest-
ment which contributes to consumer brand attachment. The struggle
for general consumer satisfaction certainly prevents the automobile
manufacturers from purposefully neglecting benefits to the public.
Presumably, since the Big Three undoubtedly are aware of their anti-
trust vulnerability, they have not intended to extinguish their small
competitors. Also, the automobile intrinsically requires a system for
orderly distribution. This system must include maintenance and repair
facilities as well as repair parts outlets. The subjective prerequisites
for granting dealership franchises-cash, character, and capacity-are
undoubtedly reasonable even though they inevitably limit the degree of
retail and service competition. The public is best served if retailers
are experienced, reliable, capable and honest. The cash requirement
contributes to an efficient allocation of resources. An applicant's will-
ingness to invest a portion of the necessary working capital indicates an
expectation that automobile retailing in an area will be profitable. In
this way, the requirements of the market place establish the allocation
of resources.
While the subjective prerequisite do not run afoul of a rule of rea-
son analysis, the objective prerequisites 230 for granting a dealership
franchise unduly restrain trade. In evaluating these objective consider-
ations, three elements must be reviewed: their effect on interbrand
competition, their effect on intrabrand competition, and their effect on
the accessibility to products and services for potential and actual cus-
tomers. The current dealer efficiency regulation affects interbrand
competition adversely. Dealership operation requirements for non-Big
Three dealers are enlarged, thereby aggravating market penetration by
small competitors. This is especially true in rural areas. Turned upon
the overall competitive structure in the automobile industry, any fur-
ther weakening of the limited competitive stimuli-both actual and po-
tential-is entirely unreasonable.
A consideration of the effect of the objective prerequisites on in-
trabrand competition is necessitated by the overall competitive situation
in the automobile industry. If there were a dozen or more domestic
229. See text accompanying note 182 supra.
230. See text accompanying note 187 supra.
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passenger car manufacturers of comparable size, intrabrand competi-
tion in the sale of any one manufacturer's product hardly would be sub-
ject to review. However, three manufacturers produce the vast ma-
jority of domestic output. Even though interbrand competition ex-
ists in the nonprice area, intrabrand competition is a most important
competitive element at the retail level. Price and service competition
desperately need every possible animation in a structural setting that
limits the number of competitors to three in areas where the market
penetration of small competitors is virtually negligible. Encouraging
intrabrand competition may increase dealer turnover rates in areas
where potential sales volume will not support two dealers. Sometimes
one General Motors, Ford or Chrysler dealer may be well above the
necessary profitability level. Yet, the addition of a second dealer
would threaten the existence of both. Where, for example, annual
sales of 200 cars are the minimum level for covering costs including
a normal return on investment and where the actual sales potential is
260 or 300 cars, either the additional dealership is not viable or the
established dealer will finally be driven out. This increase in dealer
turnover would lessen consumer-dealership attachment advantages.
Arguably, the public would benefit from the survival of the more capa-
ble of the two dealers. Where the manufacturers have not recovered
their investments in an existing dealership, certainly they will not con-
tribute to a possible erosion of their recovery prospects by granting an
additional franchise. However, sound business reasons do not immu-
nize conduct otherwise illegal.
It is only if the conduct is not unlawful in its impact in the mar-
ketplace or if the self-interest coincides with the statutory concern
with the preservation and promotion of competition that protection
is achieved.
231
In conjunction with curtailing intrabrand competition, dealer effi-
ciency regulation based on market surveys and forecasts effectively
denies some consumers access to the product and service. This is
demonstrated by the situation on the Navajo reservation. Not every car
owner can be accompanied constantly by a service mechanic. Also,
many consumers in rural areas undoubtedly must travel greater dis-
tances than metropolitan inhabitants to a dealer. The concept of the
area of primary responsibility usually guarantees a certain degree of
market cultivation that gives every customer reasonable access to a new
car and proper authorized service. When, however, manufacturers
substitute their marketing decisions for competitive developments
231. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 375 (1967).
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through efficiency regulation, the demands of the marketplace go un-
executed. This is unreasonable in the light of the industry structure
at both the production and the retail level.
In summary, dealer efficiency regulation, as manifested in objec-
tive prerequisites to the granting of a franchise, unreasonably restrains
trade because of its effects on interbrand and intrabrand competition
and customer access to the product and service. The decision not to
negotiate further with franchise applicants such as the members of
Tsegi Motors and thereby not to follow an obvious demand of a com-
munity perpetuates the existing noncompetitive dealership structure.
Where the demand can be satsified on an economically feasible bas-
is,232 the manufacturer's refusal to grant the franchise is an unreason-
able management of a distribution system combination. These activi-
ties are subject to attack for violating section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Suggested Remedies to Dealer Efficiency Regulation
To comply with section 1 of the Sherman Act, the automobile
manufacturers would have to adopt and to implement marketing poli-
cies which assure sufficient dealership in every geographic segment of
the American market. This would provide for a reasonable degree of
intrabrand competition and accessibility to products and services. Em-
phasis necessarily would shift from maintaining consumer attachment
to existing dealerships. This development would tend to facilitate
market penetration in rural areas by small firms. Thus, interbrand
competition would be enhanced wherever entry barriers of distribution
were not prohibitively high due to natural economies of scale.
With these considerations in mind, the drafting of an appropriate
remedy would not be problematic. The manufacturers would be
obliged to adopt and make public objective standards which lead to the
required dealership density. Their determinations of the number of
outlets would be subject to governmental review. This is not to sug-
gest that the government interfere with the dealership structure as
such (e.g., by ordering General Motors, Ford and Chrysler to increase
intrabrand competition by the establishment of factory-financed outlets).
Such intereference would have an immensely regulatory character;
the history of regulation in the United States demonstrates that it
seldom approaches an optimum resource allocation. Moreover, the
problems in defining the size and number of dealerships in each geo-
graphical submarket would be insuperable, especially in light of chang-
ing demand conditions. The initiative for changes should always come
232. See note 188 supra.
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from dealers on the retail level who see an opportunity to invest their
money profitably in automobile retailing.232a However, the government,
as well as prospective applicants for dealerships, must know which
standards have to be met. Without such knowledge, enforcement of
those reasonable standards through antitrust law actions would be
impossible.
A further step would be to require the Big Three to accept every
dealership application. Such an order would raise several practical
difficulties. Among these would be determining which capital require-
ments must be met by a potential retailer. If the manufacturers pre-
scribed the standards for service facilities, car and repair part inven-
tories, showroom size, advertising contributions and so forth, the cash
requirement probably would deter most applicants. The situation on
the retail level would remain basically unchanged.
If the injunction restrained the companies from making car de-
livery dependent on such factory-imposed conditions, big department
stores and used car dealers would be likely to enter a new car retailing.
However, such an order does not find its basis in the suggested inter-
pretation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The franchise distribution
system inevitably would die. Opening the automobile retail market
to an indeterminable number of outlets would destroy the combination
character of the dealer network upon which the antitrust attack was
founded. Without partial mutuality of interest between the partici-
pants, no combination is inherent in the distribution system. In the
automobile industry this mutuality is achieved through the manufac-
turer's efficiency regulation. Under an order requiring the acceptance
of all applications, the manufacturers would have no control over the
economic viability of their dealers. The present system of market
surveys would become obsolete except for rough output determinations.
The single dealer would no longer enjoy a limited guarantee that he can
survive economically under normal business conditions as a member of a
well balanced network of selected dealers. Of course, this guarantee
always is subject to changes in the dealership structure as required by
the antitrust laws. However, existing dealers reasonably can expect
their supplier to demand that new applicants fulfill a prerequisite which
all existing dealers were required to meet-the prerequisite of providing
adequate service facilities in accordance with the manufacturer's reason-
able standards. The demise of this prerequisite would lead to two types
of dealers within the respective distribution network. The combination
approach would no longer be valid. Those who believe that a better
232a. See text accompanying note 230 supra.
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distribution device for the automobile industry is conceivable will have
to look for another legal leverage.
The Location Clause
The Big Three's dealer efficiency regulation has established a
balance within their respective dealer networks. 233  This self-restriction
in granting new franchises protects existing dealers from vigorous in-
trabrand competition. This, in turn, facilitates market forecasts, pro-
duction plans and the implementation of marketing strategies. An-
other means to achieve these benefits would be territorial restrictions
imposed on existing dealers. These restrictions may be welcomed by
dealers because protection from intrabrand competition aids the deal-
ership's profitability and the thorough cultivation of the territory.
Thus, the negotiation of territorial restrictions would not be difficult.
The History of Territorial Restrictions in the Automobile Industry
Prior to World War II, territorial restrictions were common in au-
tomobile franchise agreements. However, in 1949, these restrictions
succumbed to the side effects of the Supreme Court's decision in Stand-
ard Oil Co. of California v. United States.2"4 By 1952, following the
advice of the Justice Department, all manufacturers had eliminated
territorial limitation clauses. The clauses were replaced by an area of
primary responsibility concept which obligated the dealer to cultivate
his area to the full satisfaction of the manufacturer. If the manufac-
turer was satisfied, the dealer could make more than occasional sales
in other territories. Despite this remnant of territorial security, some
members of the industry were dissatisfied with the partial demise of
restrictions.
2 35
Part of this dissatisfaction grew out of bootlegging,2 36 which was
an important feature of the reappearance of a buyer's market in
1953.237 What had existed in the 1920s in scattered areas "now, en-
233. The achievement of this balance is directly proportional to the number of ex-
clusive dealers in a manufacturer's network.
234. 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
235. See generally WHITE, supra note 3, at 163.
236. The term "bootlegging" refers to a situation in which a franchised dealer
sells new cars to nonfranchised retailer. This nonfranchised retailer then sells the
bootlegged cars in competition with franchised dealers who are responsible for the area
under the area of primary responsibility concept.
237. Following the stabilization of the Korean War defense situation, material con-
trols were removed after March 1953. Subsequently, the supply of cars was greatly
increased, and in the struggle for volume leadership all manufacturers fully exploited
their production capacity. The end of the easy postwar selling conditions was reflected
by a decline in dealer profits. See EDWARDS, DYNAMICS, supra note 3, at 29.
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couraged by an apparently new legal climate returned in epi-
demc and malignant forms. '2 3s Bootlegging reached its peak in 1955
and 1956.239 This horrified the automobile manufacturers, and they
"came to grips with bootlegging notwithstanding the antitrust briar
patch and advised their dealers that if they engaged in bootlegging it
could be reasonable to suspect that they were not fulfilling their fran-
chise obligations."2 40 The dealers and the manufacturers launched at-
tempts to curtail bootlegging. 241 General Motors proposed a new
clause for its selling agreement requiring dealers to offer inventories
back to General Motors before selling them into bootleg channels.
The Attorney General, however, refused to waive criminal proceedings
if this clause was inserted since it raised important antitrust ques-
tions.242 Informal actions failed. For example, in the 1955 model
year General Motors offered to repurchase excess supply from its deal-
ers, but few dealers took advantage of this offer.2 43
A problem closely akin to bootlegging not in form but in its effect
on the dealer body was the establishment of new branch outlets by
existing dealers.244 This can threaten profitability and complicate the
execution of the area of primary responsibility concept. Moreover,
market forecasts become less precise due to intrabrand fluctuations.
Therefore, the location clause provides that:
[The] Dealer shall not, either directly or indirectly, establish any
place or places of business for the conduct of any of its Dealership
Operations except at the locations and for the purpose described
in a current Statement of Dealership Premises that has been ex-
ecuted as provided in Subsection A of this section.245
The Effecis of the Location Clause
The location clause inherently limits the dealer's ability to reach
238. SLOAN, supra note 129, at 298.
239. Heuerman, Dealer Territorial Security and "Bootlegging" in the Auto Indus-
try, 1962 WIs. L. Rav. 486, 488 [hereinafter cited as Heuerman]. See generally WErt=,
supra note 3, at 41-42.
240. Heuerman, supra note 239, at 488.
241. See MACAULAY, supra note 143, at 44-48.
242. Hearings on HR. 528, 2688 & 6544 Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., ist & 2d Sess. 359 (1956)
(testimony of Stanley N. Barnes, Assist. Att'y Gen. m Charge of Antitrust Division).
243. SLOAN, supra note 129, at 299.
244. See note 122.
245. GM, Chevrolet Dealer Sales and Service Agreement, Section 5B, form no.
GSD 202 S, USA 8-70. The Dodge Direct Dealer Agreement Terms and Provisions
§ 7a are less explicit but not unequivocal: "Direct Dealer agrees to sell energetically
at retail m the Sales Locality described m Paragraph 1 of this agreement. " Id.,
app. XX, at 867.
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customers outside his market segment.246  The size of this segment
varies according to the shopping habits of customers, traffic connec-
tions and population density. Even though a dealer is free to sell to
customers wherever they may be located, the location clause secures
market segmentation which effectively allows the manufacturer to con-
trol the degree of intrabrand competition. The location clause factu-
ally restricts the dealer's business activities directly in terms of teritorial
freedom and indirectly in terms of freedom of customer choice. This
goes far beyond the area of primary responsibility clause which does
not confine the dealer to any area. The area of primary responsibility
clause enables the dealer to sell everywhere. As long as he fulfills his
representation obligation in his own backyard, sales in other territories
will not influence the evaluation of his sales performance. On the
other hand, the location clause reminds the dealer that the grass is
greener on his own side of the fence. It may be characterized as tak-
ing away from the dealer what the area of primary responsibility clause
gives. However, this characterization is too generous. The area of
primary responsibility clause does not grant anything. It merely re-
flects the basic idea of antitrust law that businessmen should be able to
gear their activities to the demands of the market-not to the superior
economic power and bargaining position of a manufacturer. In the
context of automobile dealerships, the location clause constitutes a flat
territorial prohibition. 247  Any other conclusion would be a gross dis-
tortion of the hard economic facts.
Unlike traditional territorial security provisions, the location
clause cannot be classified as a device to prevent a "cream skimming."
Those in favor of territorial restrictions usually advance the argument
that absent such restrictions dealers will not undertake costly selling
activities. They will not cultivate the less lucrative accounts of their
area but will rely partially on the efforts of others, thereby in effect
obtaining a free ride.248  Low cost sales to brand-attached nonshoppers
in other dealers' territories are denounced as "cream skimming."
When such sales occur, the dealer responsible for the area may have
difficulties in amortizing his investment. The establishment of a new
246. See Restricted Channels, supra note 138, at 798-99 n.17.
247. Closely related to the location clause in effect are profit passover provisions.
These provisions appear in two forms: (1) If dealer A sells a car in the territory of
dealer B, A is obligated to deliver his entire profit to B; (2) if dealer A sells a car in
the territory of dealer B, A is obligated to pay a fixed amount to B which is to cover
B's expenses accruing from servicing the car.
248. But see Comanor, supra note 148, at 1432-33. See also id. at 1428-32 (re-
butting the notion that territorial limitations encourage dealer investment and provide
dealer service as well as complete market coverage).
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sales outlet would rebut any intention to engage in "cream skim-
ming." A new outlet requires large financial investment.249 A dealer
who risks the investment for a new location, new facilities and a full in-
ventory is not doing so to steal a few "fat deals" from an already es-
tablished dealer. Of course, the new dealer's intention to achieve a
profitable basis may endanger the established dealer and increase dealer
turnover. These are merely the effects of any intrabrand competition,
and automobile dealers should not be exempt from it.
One possible objection to the stimulus of increased intrabrand
competition is that a dealer might engage in predatory selling in the
market segment served by his new branch. After he has driven the
established dealer out of the market, the new dealer could exploit his
local monopoly by raising his prices. This objection is unsound. In-
curring losses through predatory selling is economically rational only
when the prospect of subsequent supracompetitive gains exists. How-
ever, every dealer remains subject to interbrand competition which
limits his ability to raise prices. Furthermore, if dealership density is
competitively arranged, customers can switch readily to another dealer
of the same brand. Therefore, is a manufacturer has established an
appropriate dealership density in the first place, local monopolies are
unlikely. If the density is otherwise, intraband competition so far has
been suppressed; the activities of the expanding dealer should be en-
couraged by the law.
If a dealer, who opens a second outlet, neglects his representation
duties in his first dealership area, he will lose his franchise for failure
of performance. This result would affect both places of business.
Therefore, any dealer will consider carefully whether this venture into
another area is within reasonable risk limits. If he decides to expand
his business activities after weighing all factors, he should not be re-
stricted in doing so. The manufacturers raise the argument that their
detailed market surveys provide the best knowledge of what the mar-
ket can bear. This argument is ambiguous. If the manufacturers' de-
cisions are fully harmonious with demand, reliance can be placed on
market forces. Dealership contracts would not have to include loca-
tion clauses.
In summary, the automobile manufacturers effectively have
achieved control over intrabrand competition through the location
clause in connection with their dealer efficiency regulation. The
clause, which cannot be explained as a device to prevent "cream skim-
ming," has no economic justification. It merely substitutes the manu-
249. See text accompanying notes 126-29 supra.
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facturers' decisions for those which a dealer should make on the basis
of the dictates of the market.
The Location Clause and Section 1 of the Sherman Act
If the location clause is viewed as preserving the area of primary
responsibility concept, it would be classified as an ancillary restraint.
However, the area of primary responsibility concept would remain
feasible even if the location clause was held to be illegal. The pres-
ence of intrabrand competition makes the evaluation of a dealer's mar-
ket performance more difficult, particularly in times of rapidly shift-
ing demand. Nevertheless, automobile manufacturers have shown re-
markable ingenuity in developing meticulous market surveys and analy-
ses. These same manufacturers should not find the hurdle of inventing
new reasonable performance standards insurmountable. Rather, the
discussion reduces to the general question of whether intrabrand com-
petition should be sacrificed for the benefit of allegedly enhanced in-
terbrand competition.25 ° In the context of the automobile industry
this question must be answered in the negative. When interbrand
price competition and the variety of products within each price class is
as limited as in the American automobile industry, any stimulus of in-
trabrand competition must be welcomed. Any impediment can be de-
fended only by its indispensability. If the location clause were the
only means available to secure adequately functioning service markets,
it might be tolerable. However, the profitability of the service mar-
ket 251 prevents this conclusion. The location clause rather seems to
contribute unnecessarily to product differentiation barriers for new
competition and to the financial strength of established dealers. The
clause enhances customer-dealer attachments by reducing the dealer
turnover rate. While product differentiation and its companion-low
consumer substitutability-often result from real differences among
products or from the peculiar skills of particular firms, the price and
market power effects of product differentiation in the automobile in-
dustry are not offset by social gains accruing from the existence of
product variety.252 Hence, whether one or two retailers of one brand
exist in a given area does indeed make a great difference.
250. Not all the reasons for or against territorial restrictions are discussed. This
article is limited to the decisive features in the automobile industry.
251. PASHIGIAN, supra note 119, at 202. During the war period (1942-45), profit
rates of automobile dealers who did no new car business were persistently higher than
those of independent repair facilities. "Service was profitable during the war, and there
is no reason to believe it is not so now." Id. This belief was buttressed by several
automobile dealers in the San Francisco Bay area in interviews with the author.
252. See text accompanying note 148 supra.
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Because the effect of the location clause is as detrimental to com-
petition as the effect of any flat territorial restriction, it constitutes a
per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.253 In the Schwinn
case,254 where retail sales were formally free from territorial restrictions
but confined as a practical matter, the Supreme Court unequivocally
held that
[T]he decree should similarly enjoin the making of any sales to
retailers upon any condition, agreement, or understanding limiting
the retailer's freedom as to where and to whom it will resell the
products.2
55
The Court was concerned not only with explicit territorial restraints but
with any device which had the purpose or effect of keeping competitors
out of the same geographical markets.
This concern was in line with the Supreme Court's insistence that
the antitrust laws deal with the substance and not the form of re-
straints.2 50 If the automobile manufacturers were allowed to confine
each dealer to a retail area by spacing selling locations and then for-
bidding sales except from those locations, the Schwinn rule would be
completely nullified. Form would triumph over substance. Such a re-
sult would be indefensible particularly in light of the recent decision of
United States v. Glaxo Group, Ltd.157  In that case, the court stated
that Schwinn is to receive a broad and spacious, rather than a narrow
and crimping, reading. This recent treatment of territorial restrictions
was foreshadowed by several consent decrees255 and legal comments. 259
In view of this evolution, to dust off the old Boro Hall deci-
sion2 0 and add that the location clause was not rendered unlawful in
United States v. General Motors Corp.20' thereby concluding that "the
Schwinn decision does nothing to change prior law on the subject '2 2
is questionable at best. Equally fallacious is the contention that the
location clause is lawful as long as the manufacturer lawfully can grant
253. See text accompanying notes 246-48 supra.
254. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
255. Id. at 378 (emphasis added).
256. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 18 (1964); Standard Fashion
Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 354 (1922).
257. 302 F. Supp. 1, 8-11 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 93 S. Ct. 861
(1973).
258. Zimmerman, Distribution Restrictions after Sealy and Schwinn, 12 ANn-
TRUST BULL. 1181, 1187 n.8 (1967).
259. E.g., Note, The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77 HAv. L. Rnv. 62, 172 (1963).
260. Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 124 F.2d 822, rehearing denied,
130 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943).
261. 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
262. Pollock, Alternative Distribution After Schwinn,. 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 595, 603
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Pollock].
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exclusive franchises.263 These two types of restrictions are vastly dif-
ferent in terms of market impact. By an exclusive franchise agree-
ment, a manufacturer voluntarily restricts itself. However, when the
manufacturer imposes resale restrictions it exercises control over one
of the most crucial competitive decisions which any truly independent
tradesmen must make-where and to whom he will sell his wares. To
claim that granting an exclusive franchise is a lawful restraint of aliena-
tion on the manufacturer's part264 and to deny any analytical difference
to restraints of alienation imposed on members of the next economic
level is legal nonsense.
Even though the location clause is illegal on the basis of
Schwinn, 65 the automobile distribution system will continue to func-
tion. The automobile manufacturers still can subject their dealers to
certain standards of full line display, inventory keeping and warranty
service. These representation obligations simply compensate for the
advantages received by the dealer through the utilization of the manu-
facturer's goodwill. Any further requirements, however, are unjusti-
fied from the public point of view. The desire of the car makers to
have their dealers invest funds in fancier showrooms instead of new
locations is understandable as sound business because of product dif-
ferentiation effects. However, this desire is not consistent with that of
the public to have funds allocated in a way that best serves competition
and its outcome.
Such a straightforward attack against the location clause strikes a
strange contrast to the rather reluctant remedies suggested in connec-
tion with dealer efficiency regulation. Indeed, if the automobile manu-
facturers must cease to use the location clause in franchise contracts,
new retail outlets conceivably would be opened by established dealers
in conflict with the manufacturers' dealer spot determination. If the
263. Sole outlet decisions are valid restraints of trade as long as they are reason-
able. See Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke Liquors, 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied 396 U.S. 1062 (1970); Packard Motor Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243
F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 358 U.S. 822 (1957); Top All Varieties, Inc. v.
Hallmark Cards, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
264. Pollock, supra note 262, at 603.
265. The Schwinn decision has been criticized as being inconsistent in dichoto-
mizing the legal analysis into the consignment and independent businessman categories.
See Comanor, supra note 148, at 1422. "These property concepts indeed seem arbi-
trary if antitrust law is viewed as an economic engineering project. However, the
Schwinn rationale makes better sense when it is realized that the Sherman Act deals
with the concept of permissible power. By the title, risk and dominion rationale,
the Court seems merely to articulate a point beyond which one economic unit is not
permitted to limit the freedom of action of another." Distribution Practices, supra
note 1, at 105.
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location clause until now was a bulwark against new car sales through
department stores and other referral outlets,266 the discounters might
intrude into the franchised dealer network. However, in contrast to an
order to sell new cars to virtually everybody who places orders and
pays cash, the loss of the location clause is unlikely to lead to a mush-
rooming of new outlets. In order to be competitive, new branches
would require a high investment. This investment would approxi-
mate that which went into the first outlet. Therefore, with the elimi-
nation of the location clause from franchise contracts, the freedom of
dealers as to where and to whom they will sell will be increased. This
probably will lead only to sporadic changes in the distribution pattern
and will not affect the viability of the franchised distribution system.
The principal result of the demise of the location will be the preserva-
tion of the dealer's freedom to do business. At least in some areas,
intrabrand competition will be enhanced, and the manufacturers' sti-
fling of intrabrand competition will be replaced by the operation of
market forces.
Proposed Legal Treatment of Firms in the Automobile Industry
The illegality of the location clause and dealer efficiency regula-
tion under Sherman section 1 raises the question of whether an anti-
trust attack should focus on all competitors in the automobile indus-
try, only the Big Three, or General Motors alone. Presently, dis-
crimination should be exercised in the analysis of the restraints of trade
which are inherent in the combination between manufacturers and
their dealer networks-that is, in the analysis of dealer efficiency regula-
tion. The history of the automobile industry demonstrates that new-
comers and small competitors experience difficulties in their attempts
to form and maintain strong dealer bodies. Yet, their contribution to
competition ultimately depends on the reliability and strength of their
retail outlets. Little will be gained by the possibility of enhanced in-
trabrand competition among American Motors dealers. Unless dealer
spot determination of the small firms is blatantly arbitrary, the anti-
trust laws should not interfere with the small competitors' struggle to
gain a foothold in the automobile market. This argument is especially
sound in light of the situation in rural areas. In these areas the ques-
tion normally is whether one outlet of a small company and the re-
sultant increased interbrand competition is possible or economically
feasible in the first place. The market penetration disadvantage of
these small car producers is particularly evident in sparsely populated
266. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
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areas. Their dealer spot determination hopefully is a strategem in
their fight for existence rather than dealer efficiency regulation influ-
enced by product differentiation considerations.
As far as the unlawfulness of the location clause is concerned, the
general rules developed for territorial restrictions apply. Even the
advocates of a strict per se approach do not deny that "some form of
restraint on competition may be necessary to encourage the develop-
ment of the distribution facilities which are needed to market success-
fully a new product or to promote successfully the entry of a new
firm.126 7  Moreover, American Motors' declining market share may
merit application of the failing company defense.26 Both of these
excuses are intended to encourage a new or failing company's dealers
to risk their investment. The application of these excuses is coun-
tered by the possibility that less restrictive methods are available. For
example, an exclusive franchise containing a primary responsibility
clause arguably will serve to make small companies more effective
competitors through the increased promotion efforts of their dealers.
2 69
Therefore, in light of this alternative, new entrants and failing com-
panies in the automobile market would be required to show extreme
necessity for the location clause. However, this discussion of the
availability of defenses to the inclusion of location clauses by new-
comers and failing companies may be merely rhetorical. As a practical
matter, their dealers' financial strength will seldom allow the establish-
ment of new branches. The newcomer and failing company defenses
have practical relevance only in situations involving discount houses.
Whether these outlets fall within the scope of the location clause is still
unanswered.
2 70
Of decidedly more importance is whether an antitrust attack
should discriminate between General Motors on the one hand and
Ford and Chrysler on the other. With regard to the location clause, no
reason for a differential treatment is conceivable. However, in the
area of dealer efficiency regulation, discrimination in legal treatment
may be necessary. Such an approach could be based on Judge Wyzan-
ski's decision in United States v. United Shore Machinery Corp.27' In
267. Comanor, supra note 148, at 1438.
268. See Sandura Co. v. FTC, 338 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964). See also United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 374 (1967).
269. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 271 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring); Note, Newcomer Defenses: Reasonable Use of Tie-Ins, Franchises, Ter-
ritorials and Exclusives, 18 STAN. L. REV. 457, 469-70 (1966).
270. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
271. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
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his remedy opinion, he developed the different economic category con-
cept.27 2 Undoubtedly, General Motors' massive size, market share
and power are salient characteristics of the automobile industry. How-
ever, Ford and Chrysler are by no means dwarfs.2 7- As long as Gen-
eral Motors cannot be labeled a monopolist, claims that it "has already
put itself in a class different from any of its competitors 274 would be
difficult to maintain. Moreover, the proposed antitrust actions are de-
signed to benefit the public. Thus, there is little reason to allow Ford
and Chrysler to continue marketing policies which are detrimental to
the public and small competitors.
Conclusion
The management of the automobile distribution system artificially
increases barriers to competition. This places small manufacturers
and potential newcomers at a definite disadvantage. Workable com-
petition is threatened by dealer efficiency regulation which reduces both
intrabrand and interbrand competition. Furthermore, such regulation
is a possible source of a shortage of intercorporate dealerships. Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act is an appropriate tool to remedy these
threats. Its application is dependent on a finding that a single dealer-
manufacturer network constitutes a vertical combination. An injunc-
tion of the unreasonable restraints of trade stemming from the man-
agement of this combination will not affect the manufacturer's reason-
able desire for adequate promotion of its products, honest representation
of its image and preservation of its public good will. Subjective and
objective standards which reflect marketing necessities intrinsic in the
automobile still can be adopted and implemented. However, this may
be too little in exchange for the paradise lost-the paradise of undis-
turbed retail market determination and intrabrand competition regula-
tion. From the manufacturers' standpoint, adequate representation
may no longer prevail. Their response could be vertical integration.
Predictions of vertical integration in industries have proved to be
remarkably unreliable in the past. Justice Douglas dissented from the
Supreme Court's decision in Standard Oil Co. of California v. United
States&2 75 on the basis that the Court unwisely would hold vertical own-
ership integration lawful. He feared that oil refiners would be en-
couraged to replace independent small business service stations with
272. 110 F. Supp. at 350.
273. See note 5 supra.
274. 110 F. Supp. at 350.
275. 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
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their own outlets and employees after the Court held Standard Oil's
exclusive requirement contracts unlawful. Justice Douglas' prophecy
that the "small, independent business man will be supplanted by
clerks. . . . The situation is not ideal . . . [but] the alternative
which the Court offers is far worse. . . The Court approves what the
Anti-Trust Laws were designed to prevent ' 276 was not validated by
time.277 In the Schwinn case, 278 the government discarded the proba-
bility of vertical integration as a hollow threat.279  The unchanged
distribution system in the oil industry seemed to lend support to the
government's view. However, Justice Stewart, dissenting in Schwinn,
reiterated Justice Douglas' fear. The Schwinn dissent was closer to the
truth:280 "In Galbraithian terms, Schwinn has replaced the strategy
of control of the market with the strategy of superseding the mar-
ket."' 281 In August 1967, Schwinn announced to its dealers and
distributors that it was planning ultimately to distribute its bicycles and
other products through factory-owned sales subsidiaries. Nine inde-
pendent distributors were immediately terminated as of December 31,
1967, and Schwinn has subsequently repurchased these distributors'
remaining inventory of Schwinn products.
282
However, Schwinn is not General Motors, Ford or Chrysler. The
costs of carrying cars, parts and accessories and providing repair facili-
ties are far greater than those for distributing bicycles. As long as a
majority of dealers resist the manufacturer's attempts to buy them out,
the loss of experience, local reputation and buyer-dealer attachment
will accumulate with the costs of vertical ownership integration. The
prospect of seeing many "old" dealers devoting their investment, ex-
perience and efforts to small competitors would further deter the Big
Three from vertical forward integration. As long as planning in terms
of production and market penetration is not severely hampered by the
development of a random distribution system, the Big Three are un-
likely to shift away from a system of selected, franchised dealers. "In-
ability to agree upon certain restrictions does not mean that distribution
automatically becomes a rat's nest of chaotic, inefficient, fly-by-night
competition. Indeed, the willingness of a number of companies to
276. Id. at 320-21 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
277. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
278. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
279. Pollock, supra note 262, at 610 n.60.
280. 388 U.S. at 384 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
281. Distribution Practices, supra note 1, at 108.
282. Keck, Alternative Distribution Techniques-Franchising, Consignment, Agency
and Licensing, 13 ANTrrruST BuLL. 177, 188-90 (1968).
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sign consent decrees barring territorial restrictions . . . suggest that
these are not the matter of life or death for effective distribution so
often claimed." 28  Because vertical forward integration is unlikely,
the public will gain from the proposed antitrust attack against features
of the distribution system. The judicial demise of the location clause
and the check on dealer efficiency regulation will encourage intrabrand
competition in an industry whose structure has not proved to be con-
ducive to workable interbrand competition. The anticipated increase
of competitive stimuli will be achieved at little expense.
283. Zimmerman, supra note 258, at 1186-87.

